CLEANUP REFORM

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@igc.org>]

I prepared the following remarks for a panel presentation tomorrow 
(11/15/95) at the National Environmental Policy Institute Cleanup 
Forum/Department of Navy Environmental and Natural Resource Program 
Managers Meeting in San Diego, California. However, the meeting was 
shut down at noon today because of the Federal budget impasse. LS

Reform Cleanup without Weakening Goals

by Lenny Siegel
November, 1995

 The current national approach to cleaning up hazardous wastes 
often gets the job done, but it's frustrating. Polluters and other 
responsible parties argue that they're required to spend too much 
money. Communities aren't sure that their health or the natural 
environment is being adequately protected.

 While there are many creative reforms in the wind, the thrust 
of most proposals for administrative and legislative reform is to 
reduce cleanup. As a someone who lives within a few miles of more than 
a dozen Superfund sites, including Moffett Naval Air Station, this 
worries me. I am sure there are some situations where current rules and 
procedures force unrealistic cleanup remedies, but I am equally certain 
that the existing process allows as much contamination to be swept 
under the tarmac.

 Unless we can be assured, to scientific certainty, that 
hazardous substances are breaking down into harmless byproducts faster 
than they are being spread or released, then we should carefully 

question cleanup requirements that permanently leave contamination in 
place. I recognize, however, that we're still figuring out how to deal 
with certain types of contamination, such as radionuclides and 
unexploded ordnance. 

 Partial solutions based upon limited future land or water use 
scenarios not only pose a threat to public health and the environment, 
but they lower the value of the affected property, whether that value 
is measured by resale value or simply potential public use. Decision to 
weaken standards based upon use may pass on environmental costs to 
future generations, so we should be treat such decisions in the same 
vein as the periodic vote to raise the national debt.

 I also believe that the fundamental principle of our current 
system of liability - that the polluter must pay - is not only fair, 
but it provides generators of hazardous waste with an enormous 
incentive to properly manage or prevent the generation of wastes. In my 
experience, both the electronics industry and the military have become 
leaders in pollution prevention because they've been hit hard with the 
cost of cleanup.

 I do think there is room for new approaches, however, where 
cleanup costs are absorbed by responsible parties who in fact bear no 
responsibility for the contamination.

 But I didn't come here to defend the current system. In 
redefining our approach to cleanup, I support three essential reforms. 
All of these are underway to some degree or another, but in today's 
political climate they do not achieve the spotlight proffered to 
proposals to weaken cleanup objectives.

1. Actual investigation or cleanup, not the delivery of documents, 
should be the measurable goal of cleanup programs.

2. The funding, management, and oversight of cleanup should cut 
through arbitrary geographic boundaries and distinctions among media.

3. Direct public participation in the oversight of cleanup should 
be strengthened.

REDUCE THE FOCUS ON DOCUMENTS

 When I first read the Federal Facilities Agreement for Moffett 
Field, I was confused. The schedule established milestones for the 
completion of a long series of documents, but it didn't really tell me 
when actual cleanup would be accomplished. I attributed my confusion to 
my naivet, but when our group finally hired a technical consultant, he 
asked essentially the same question. I concluded, over a period of 
time, that our system of conducting investigation and cleanup contains 
built-in inefficiencies, based upon the endemic focus on the production 
of documents.

 When I agreed to serve on the External Review Group of the Air 
Combat Command's project on Streamlined Oversight, I found out how 
extensive that inefficiency was. The project concluded:

 Findings of the report suggest that the current set of 
institutional relationships that form the regulatory oversight process 
accounts for significant time and money spent on the investigation and 
cleanup of Air Force hazardous waste sites. Estimates suggest that this 
process may account for as much as 60 percent of the time and 10 
percent of the costs of a typical Remedial Investigation/Feasibility 
Study (RI/FS). These costs are not the result of individual players 
(regulators, Air Force, contractors, community) in the oversight 
interaction failing to conduct their jobs properly, but rather the 
existence of a system that is often driven by documents and 
deliverables, as well as definitions of roles and responsibilities that 
may be inherently inefficient.^1

 The project consultants also found out that state and 
regulatory agencies not only did not have the capacity to review the 
documents that regularly cross their desk, but that the continuing 
generation of new documents will put them further and further behind. 
That is, activities are not only delayed by the time it takes to review 
and comment on documents, but by the time it takes the regulator to 
pore through the backlog of documents he or she must address first.

 I'm not sure why, but government participants in the project 
were surprised to hear that environmentalist representatives didn't 
like facing a bookshelf full of documents for every site that concerned 
us. But even if the best of situations, activists don't have the 
resources to review every last detail of a cleanup activity. We want to 
focus our energy in overseeing and advising on critical decisions.

 Why do we have to move so much paper before we move dirt? Many 
of the documents are not even required by law. Others need not be so 
bulky. There are many reasons, including the following: 

* The cleanup process, originally developed for private 
facilities, is inherently adversarial. Thus, each party generates, 
reviews, and responds to comments on the assumption that their lawyers 
will have to go to court to defend their position. In fact, often after 
the engineers have done their work, their respective lawyers routinely 
go through it.

* When the process was developed, computer networking systems 
that facilitate the sharing of data in electronic form were not 
generally accessible.

* Consultants, it appears, must get paid by the page. They often 
repeat boilerplate and other material in multiple documents.

 The solution, of course, is for all parties to agree up front 
which documents are really necessary. For large facilities, such as 
military bases, it is possible to generate standard documents that 
guide work at numerous sites, and then to prepare "exception reports" 
where site-specific conditions dictate changes. The more the parties 
trust eat Command, August, 1995.
 requirements. Nothing builds suspicion more than withholding 
information. In fact, people often demand information simply because 
they've been told that they can't have it. At Moffett, we've worked out 
procedures through which subcommittees of the RAB receive documents 
automatically, while other members only receive them upon request.

5. The community needs access to independent technical help. At 
Moffett and the surrounding civilian sites, the community receives EPA 
technical assistance grants, and our consultants have helped us frame 
our role constructively in the process. At non-Superfund sites such as 
North Island, however, community members of an otherwise effective RAB 
are telling me that their work is severely constrained by the lack of 
such support.

6. RPMs and other field officials should not be penalized for 
taking the time to interact with the public or the regulatory agencies. 
Timetables set important goals, but more often than not working things 
out early in the process will save time and other resources later.

 I recognize that many government officials have bought into the 
concept of public participation because they want community groups to 
take the heat for decisions to skip or delay cleanup activities. That's 
not enough. The affected public not only has the right, but it often 
has site-specific expertise, to improve the entire cleanup program. We 
don't want to bust the budget. We don't consider every single site top 
priority. Participation in the process actually takes a lot of time and 
energy. 

 Nothing undermines our trust for the process more than 
proposals which would allow polluters to avoid their obligation to 
clean up after themselves. If that's what meant by reform, then the 
entire system will grind to a halt. If reform means spreading 
successful techniques, some of which I have mentioned earlier, then the 
spirit of partnership will bring better results.

^1. Versar Corporation, "Moving Sites Faster through Streamlined 
Oversight," US Air Force Air Combat Command, August, 1995.
 requirements. Nothing builds suspicion more than withholding 
information. In fact, people often demand information simply because 
they've been told that they can't have it. At Moffett, we've worked out 
procedures through which subcommittees of the RAB receive documents 
automatically, while other members only receive them upon request.

5. The community needs access to independent technical help. At 
Moffett and the surrounding civilian sites, the community receives EPA 
technical assistance grants, and our consultants have helped us frame 
our role constructively in the process. At non-Superfund sites such as 
North Island, however, community members of an otherwise effective RAB 
are telling me that their work is severely constrained by the lack of 
such support.

6. RPMs and other field officials should not be penalized for 
taking the time to interact with the public or the regulatory agencies. 
Timetables set important goals, but more often than not working things 
out early in the process will save time and other resources later.

 I recognize that many government officials have bought into the 
concept of public participation because they want community groups to 
take the heat for decisions to skip or delay cleanup activities. That's 
not enough. The affected public not only has the right, but it often 
has site-specific expertise, to improve the entire cleanup program. We 
don't want to bust the budget. We don't consider every single site top 
priority. Participation in the process actually takes a lot of time and 
energy. 

 Nothing undermines our trust for the process more than 
proposals which would allow polluters to avoid their obligation to 
clean up after themselves. If that's what meant by reform, then the 
entire system will grind to a halt. If reform means spreading 
successful techniques, some of which I have mentioned earlier, then the 
spirit of partnership will bring better results.

^1. Versar Corporation, "Moving Sites Faster through Streamlined 
Oversight," US Air Force Air Combat Command, August, 1995.
 requirements. Nothing builds suspicion more than withholding 
information. In fact, people often demand information simply because 
they've been told that they can't have it. At Moffett, we've worked out 
procedures through which subcommittees of the RAB receive documents 
automatically, while other members only receive them upon request.

5. The community needs access to independent technical help. At 
Moffett and the surrounding civilian sites, the community receives EPA 
technical assistance grants, and our consultants have helped us frame 
our role constructively in the process. At non-Superfund sites such as 
North Island, however, community members of an otherwise effective RAB 
are telling me that their work is severely constrained by the lack of 
such support.

6. RPMs and other field officials should not be penalized for 
taking the time to interact with the public or the regulatory agencies. 
Timetables set important goals, but more often than not working things 
out early in the process will save time and other resources later.

 I recognize that many government officials have bought into the 
concept of public participation because they want community groups to 
take the heat for decisions to skip or delay cleanup activities. That's 
not enough. The affected public not only has the right, but it often 
has site-specific expertise, to improve the entire cleanup program. We 
don't want to bust the budget. We don't consider every single site top 
priority. Participation in the process actually takes a lot of time and 
energy. 

 Nothing undermines our trust for the process more than 
proposals which would allow polluters to avoid their obligation to 
clean up after themselves. If that's what meant by reform, then the 
entire system will grind to a halt. If reform means spreading 
successful techniques, some of which I have mentioned earlier, then the 
spirit of partnership will bring better results.

^1. Versar Corporation, "Moving Sites Faster through Streamlined 
Oversight," US Air Force Air Combat Command, August, 1995.
 requirements. Nothing builds suspicion more than withholding 
information. In fact, people often demand information simply because 
they've been told that they can't have it. At Moffett, we've worked out 
procedures through which subcommittees of the RAB receive documents 
automatically, while other members only receive them upon request.

5. The community needs access to independent technical help. At 
Moffett and the surrounding civilian sites, the community receives EPA 
technical assistance grants, and our consultants have helped us frame 
our role constructively in the process. At non-Superfund sites such as 
North Island, however, community members of an otherwise effective RAB 
are telling me that their work is severely constrained by the lack of 
such support.

6. RPMs and other field officials should not be penalized for 
taking the time to interact with the public or the regulatory agencies. 
Timetables set important goals, but more often than not working things 
out early in the process will save time and other resources later.

 I recognize that many government officials have bought into the 
concept of public participation because they want community groups to 
take the heat for decisions to skip or delay cleanup activities. That's 
not enough. The affected public not only has the right, but it often 
has site-specific expertise, to improve the entire cleanup program. We 
don't want to bust the budget. We don't consider every single site top 
priority. Participation in the process actually takes a lot of time and 
energy. 

 Nothing undermines our trust for the process more than 
proposals which would allow polluters to avoid their obligation to 
clean up after themselves. If that's what meant by reform, then the 
entire system will grind to a halt. If reform means spreading 
successful techniques, some of which I have mentioned earlier, then the 
spirit of partnership will bring better results.

^1. Versar Corporation, "Moving Sites Faster through Streamlined 
Oversight," US Air Force Air Combat Command, August, 1995.