EPA Enclosure to DOD on UXO Issues

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

[This is the enclosure to the April 22, 1999 letter from Tim Fields to
Sherri Goodman. - LS]


ENCLOSURE: EPA ISSUES AT CLOSED, TRANSFERRED, AND TRANSFERRING MILITARY
RANGES

     During the last several years an increasing number of issues have
arisen relative to UXO, hazardous contaminants, and military range
cleanup.   The following represents a description of the major EPA
issues or concerns along with installations where we have encountered
these problems.  This list should not be construed as exhaustive.

1) Range Assessment and Investigation

a) Range investigations often lack sufficient site-specific
information.  The Services and the USACE generally are not adhering to
CERCLA standards and procedures for assessment and cleanup.  The PA/SI,
RI/FS, Removal, Remedial, and NOFA processes need to be equivalent to
those specified under CERCLA and the NCP.   [For example, at the Black
Hills Army Depot the PA/SI did not meet the minimum requirements set by
EPA for assessment.  The RI/FS workplans and all associated documents
were based upon this deficient PA/SI and were also determined not to
meet EPA minimum requirements.   Other sites with similar issues include
Savanna Army Depot, Badlands Bombing Range, Lowry Bombing Range, Fort
Ritchie, Fort Meade, and the Nansemond Ordnance Depot.]  

b) There has been an increasing tendency for UXO investigations to use
statistical grid sampling methods.  Although statistical grid sampling
may yield additional information, extrapolation of these results often
lead to inappropriate decisions. The statistical grid sampling approach
used by the USACE would only be appropriate if one expected a relatively
uniform distribution of UXO, which is not the case at military ranges. 
EPA believes that in order to achieve protection of human health and the
environment, UXO investigations should be based on a combination of
information such as historical data (e.g., archives, photos,
interviews), range use information, visual site inspections, previous
detection surveys, previous Explosives and Ordnance Demolition (EOD)
Unit response actions, and the resultant knowledge of impact zones and
"hot spots." [For example, at the Lowry Bombing Range the USACE proposed
and attempted to use the statistical sampling and extrapolation
methodology.  The State of Colorado has recently indicated that those
methods significantly underestimated the amount of ordnance present
(inert or live).  Other sites that have similar issues are Savanna Army
Depot, Fort Ord, Fort Ritchie, and the Nansemond Army Depot.]  

c) Military ranges generally are not designated by the Services or the
USACE as areas of concern (AOC) even when the installation is listed on
the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL).   EPA believes all areas
at closed, transferred, and transferring bases with known or suspected
UXO are areas of concern and need to be evaluated in the CERCLA and NCP
context.  More recently, the Services and the USACE have unilaterally
excluded UXO areas from proposed CERCLA Records of Decisions (RODs) or
from RODs being implemented where UXO was included in the remedy (e.g.,
NAF Adak, Umatilla Army Depot) .  [At the Umatilla Army Depot, the Army 
has indicated that they will not address UXO as specified in the ROD.  
This decision is now in dispute resolution.  At NAF Adak, the Navy has
recently indicated that they do not wish to proceed with a ROD for a
separate UXO operable unit.  At Savanna Army Depot, the entire depot
(approximately 21 square miles) was initially utilized as a firing
range.  Activities up to 1997 were not directed at UXO assessment and
response, rather they were directed in large degree toward open burning
and disposal grounds and non-explosive chemical contamination.   Up to
this time, UXO in potential firing areas was not included within the
realm of the potential cleanup, therefore, most UXO prone or suspected
areas were not considered areas of concern.   In 1998, the Army
tentatively agreed to evaluate several options for assessing areas known
or suspected to be contaminated with UXO.   The USACE has proposed to
use Sitestats/Gridstats which EPA believes is a very problematic
analytical method (see 1b above).  Other facilities that have ranges
with similar issues include, but are not limited to: Jefferson Proving
Ground, Lowry Bombing Range, Badlands Bombing Range, Fort Meade, Camp
Bonneville, Fort Ord, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Tobyhanna Army Depot, NAF
Adak, and Fort Ritchie.]       

d) EPA is encouraged by DoD's recent shift to address ranges through a
"risk management" strategy focusing on both range assessment and
remediation for UXO and other constituents.  DoD needs to continue to
develop and ultimately implement this approach through the USACE and the
Services.  However, despite this recent change in strategy, EPA has
noted at a number of ranges the USACE continues to apply statistical
sampling and risk assessment methods which often lead to premature
"informed risk management decisions."  Since the proposed Range Rule
process is heavily dependent upon accurate "informed risk management
decision making," DoD needs to ensure that this revised strategy
develops accurate information, reduces short-term risks, and sets the
stage to achieve long-term risk reduction goals.   The current approach
utilized by the USACE generally does not address these goals.   [For
example, at Fort Ritchie, the Army had proposed to surface clear and
provide contractor support in UXO areas that have been proposed by the
LRA to include a residential area.  Based in large degree upon the
statistical sampling, the Army wanted to perform only a surface
clearance, even though the DDESB standards recommend much more
conservative clearance for residential land use.  It is important to
note that in many areas where UXO clearance is not performed to the
frost line or sufficient depth, additional UXO is likely to surface via
frost heaving or erosional processes (i.e., mortars have been found to
surface on a golf course).  These and other UXO-related issues require
the Army develop a long-term UXO remedial strategy for this area.  Other
ranges with similar circumstances include Savanna Army Depot, Lowry
Bombing Range, Fort Meade, Nansemond Army Depot, Fort Ord, Jefferson
Proving Ground, and Badlands Bombing Range.]    

e)  DoD is generally not applying the best available technologies to
assess and remediate UXO.   In most cases, there appears to be a
standard approach to default to the traditional methods known as "mag
and flag".   Yet, according to the USACE and others, application of
these methods often results in more expensive, slower, and less accurate
UXO detections than other demonstrated technologies.   DoD needs to
begin using better technologies earlier to achieve the most protective
level of UXO cleanup, while continuing to examine the capabilities,
uncertainties,  and acceptabilities of the various detection
approaches.  [For example, at Fort Ritchie only surface clearance is
proposed for areas known to be contaminated with UXO that will be used
for residential and commercial purposes.   When asked what measures
would be used during excavation, the Army indicated they would only have
personnel on-site with a magnetometer.   At Badlands Bombing Range, the
artillery impact area was surveyed using mag and flag but this location
would have been suitable for using multiple towed array sensor methods
that have yielded more reliable results at other similar locations at
Badlands.]   

f) In those cases where UXO investigations at ranges (or UXO sites) have
been performed, the general approach has been to limit investigation to
known ranges/ UXO sites only.   Investigations should not be limited to
within the "fenceline," especially when information suggests that UXO
problems are more extensive. [Although Aberdeen Proving Ground has
agreed to perform additional clearance ¨ mile around the existing
facility, no additional investigation is being performed off-site (e.g.,
especially in the adjacent rivers or in the Chesapeake Bay).  Other
sites with similar issues include the Badlands Bombing Range, Savanna
Army Depot, Tooele Army Depot, Lowry Bombing Range, Jefferson Proving
Ground, and NAF Adak.]

2) Non-Compliance with Regulatory Authorities

a) DDESB 6055.9 Standards for depth of clearance generally are not being
followed. [For example, at Fort Ritchie a surface clearance is proposed
for a residential area.  DDESB 6055.9 Standards (Chapter 12) specifies
that default depths of clearance to 10 feet should be used unless an
alternative is justified and approved by the DDESB based on detailed
site-specific information.  As no detailed investigations have taken
place over the range areas at Fort Ritchie, a default clearance depth of
10 feet should be used (unless bedrock is shallower).  Please note that
EPA views Chapter 12 as critical due to the nature of explosives safety
issues.  In addition, many other range situations have already been
documented to have uncontrolled listed wastes (and/or hazardous
substances) and may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
human health and the environment.  Other ranges with similar problems
include: Savanna Army Depot, Fort Meade, Fort Ord, Badlands Bombing
Range, Lowry Bombing Range, Umatilla Army Depot, Camp Bonneville,
Jefferson Proving Ground, Nansemond Ordnance Depot, Tooele Army Depot,
and NAF Adak.] 

 b) Current EPA environmental regulations, including, but not limited
to, RCRA and CERCLA, are applicable, but generally are not being
followed.  [This is particularly relevant to the depth of clearance of
UXO.   Many UXO-contaminated areas at closed, transferred, or
transferring military ranges are: 1) not being investigated, or 2) when
discovered, are not being addressed consistent with human health,
environmental, or explosives safety regulations.   These types of
situations have been noted at many ranges including: Savanna Army Depot,
Fort Meade, Fort Ord, Badlands Bombing Range, Lowry Bombing Range,
Umatilla Army Depot, Camp Bonneville, Jefferson Proving Ground,
Nansemond Ordnance Depot, Tooele Army Depot, and NAF Adak.  Other
information pertinent to this issue is presented in 1(a) above, and 4(a)
below.]

3) Communication, Coordination and Dissemination of Information

Efforts by the Services and the USACE to communicate the scope, nature,
and extent of UXO response activities have not always been successful.  
In some cases, there has been little or no effort.  Regulators and the
public need to be better informed during all stages of the efforts to
address military ranges.  The over-reliance on time-critical response
actions also tends to reduce coordination with the regulators and other
non-DoD parties.  [For example, the regulators and the public have been
discouraged by the USACE lack of cooperation at the Black Hills Army
Depot.  Adequate information and answers concerning investigations and
cleanup activities have not been provided to these parties.  At Fort
Wingate there has been little or no public involvement concerning UXO
issues.  At BRAC RAB meetings only cursory information is presented on
the USACE activities.  Neither the State, Tribes, or the general public
have received sufficient documentation on the USACE UXO activities at
Fort Wingate that has both BRAC and FUDS properties. Another example is
with the proposed transfer of property at Fort McClellan.  The Army has
been in the process of negotiating a transfer of UXO contaminated
property with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS).  It appears
that State and Federal regulatory agencies have not been contacted to
participate in these negotiations.   Similar situations have been noted
at the Badlands Bombing Range, Lowry Bombing Range, Jefferson Proving
Ground, Fort Ord, and Fort Ritchie.] 

4) Remedy Selection and Implementation

a) EPA believes some range UXO detection/clearance operations may not be
appropriate for CERCLA removal nor RCRA emergency situations.  To
further complicate matters is the Service/USACE preference to implement
"CERCLA-like" accelerated actions.  Some of these actions may not be
consistent with CERCLA and the NCP and generally result in less
regulator and public oversight/involvement.  Using
time-critical/emergency responses as the sole response paradigm should
not be a default approach for the Services/USACE, especially for range
problems that are well beyond the scope of such actions.  [For example,
at Fort Ord clearance was conducted for several years as a time-critical
removal action.  Similar circumstances are noted at Jefferson Proving
Ground, Umatilla Army Depot, and Fort Meade.]

 b) There is a general over-reliance on institutional controls as the
principal remedy component or as the only remedy to ensure
protectiveness.   Where employed, the institutional controls may not be
adequately defined, roles and responsibilities are left unclear and
ultimately they may not prevent future incidents where UXO is
encountered.  The Services and the USACE are not always implementing
adequate access controls (e.g., fencing, posting of guards, patrols,
etc.)  where needed.   In addition, periodic inspections need to be
performed at many locations where UXO has been identified, is suspected,
or may have surfaced via erosion or frost heaving at previously cleared
areas. [For example, at NAF Adak institutional controls are proposed for
vast areas outside the town where UXO will generally not be cleared, nor
has the area been adequately investigated despite DoD records indicating
potentially extensive UXO contamination.   This appears to be a problem
because the recent reuse proposals to expand the town's uses are
expected to lead to an increase in the population (primarily members of
the Aleut Tribe, especially children).   At Tobyhanna Army Depot, a
20,000 acre UXO area is now a State park where only signs were posted. 
The park was closed in 1997 when 53 unexploded 37 mm shells were found
and a recent removal action has found significant additional UXO.  
Other examples of access problems have been noted at Camp Elliott
(Tierrasanta), Camp Bonneville, Jefferson Proving Ground, Lowry Bombing
Range, Badlands Bombing Range, Fort Ritchie, Fort Wingate, and Nansemond
Army Depot.] 

c) Effective regulatory and DoD oversight is an important aspect of
remedy implementation.  When it is not implemented, the risk of
incidents increase.  [For example, the UXO from the Fort Irwin cleanup
was mistaken for clean scrap and transported to a scrap yard for
recycling (in violation of RCRA   the UXO went to a non-permitted
facility without manifest). An employee was killed when he attempted to
cut live UXO with welding equipment.   Other examples of where better
oversight was needed include, Fort Ord, Jefferson Proving Ground, and
Fort Meade where UXO contaminated areas were inappropriately slated for
transfer.]      

5) Transfer of UXO Contaminated Land

a) EPA believes DoD generally should retain ownership and/or control of
UXO areas that are not yet assessed and/or cleaned up as determined by
DoD, the appropriate regulatory agencies and the public (e.g.,
"permanently dudded" impact areas; UXO burial sites; sites not yet
scheduled to be remediated).  Federal land management agencies generally
want DoD to complete all environmental restoration prior to any transfer
to them.  Present land transfer practices by DoD indicate that UXO
contaminated lands continue to be transferred. [At Fort McClellan the
transfer of approximately 10,000 acres of UXO contaminated land has been
proposed.  The area has not been adequately assessed and UXO
contamination not yet addressed.   The proposed transfer is to the USFWS
who do not appear to have sufficient resources to address UXO
contamination of this magnitude.  At Jefferson Proving Ground, a portion
of UXO contaminated property north of the firing line was proposed for
transfer to the USFWS.  The area was proposed to be used for
recreational purposes, but it has not been thoroughly assessed and UXO
not addressed.   It has also been mentioned that the USFWS has since
decided not to proceed with the transfer.  At Nomans Land Island,
although the fed-to-fed transfer has already taken place, DoD has a
continuing obligation to address UXO safety issues there, as does the
USFWS (i.e., to secure the property against trespassers, per the
transfer agreement).  Although the area is planned to be used as a
wildlife refuge, it is known to be frequented by boating enthusiasts,
and UXO safety issues remain because storm events and other processes
(freeze/thaw) will continue to expose UXO in areas where only surface
clearance has been performed.  At Fort Wingate, two closed test ranges
containing UXO are slated for transfer to the DOI.  The land may then be
re-developed for residential, commercial, open space, and subsistence
farming/ranching uses.  Much of these lands are proposed to be
transferred to the DOI.   Another example is the UXO contaminated areas
transferred to the State at the Tobyhanna Army Depot.]

b) In some cases, the Services and the USACE have performed only a
cursory investigation (see # 1).  Based upon limited information,
property has been and is being transferred.  Rather than sufficiently
assessing sites and making the property safe for use or transfer, the
DoD and the Services appear to be transferring the land and then waiting
for others to identify problems for DoD response.   [For example, DoD is
contacted periodically about newly found UXO at a number of transferred
sites.  This has been noted at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Raritan
Arsenal, Morgan Depot, White Sands Missile Range, Lowry Bombing Range,
Badlands Bombing Range, Fort Ritchie, Tobyhanna Army Depot, Fort Ord,
Fort Meade (i.e., Tipton Air Field), Jefferson Proving Ground, Raritan
Arsenal, Morgan Depot, and at EPA private sites such as the Cohen
Property Site in Massachusetts.  Although the EOD units have a good
response record, their responses tend to be limited to the newly found
UXO, with generally no further investigation performed to determine the
nature and extent of any additional UXO.  This EOD "house call" type
follow-up cannot substitute for adequate investigations.]