[CPEO-MEF] Did Army negligence cause Utah nerve agent release?

[kefcrowe@acs.eku.edu]

Chemical Weapons Working Group
P.O. Box 467     Berea, KY 40403
859-986-0868 859-986-2695 (F)
kefwilli@acs.eku.edu    www.cwwg.org

for more information contact:
Jason Groenewald: (801) 364-5110
Craig Williams: (859) 986-7565
Bob Schaeffer : (941) 395-6773

for immediate release: Wednesday May 17, 2000
CITIZENS DEMAND IMMEDIATE EXPLANATION OF FOUR HOUR DELAY IN PUBLIC NOTICE
OF CHEM. WEAPONS INCINERATOR NERVE GAS RELEASE;  ARMY VIOLATED ITS OWN
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND STATE OF UTAH OPERATIONAL PERMIT

Utah residents are outraged that Army officials waited more than four hours
after the May 8 nerve agent GB (Sarin) leaked into the atmosphere from the
controversial Tooele, Utah chemical weapons incinerator before alerting
the public.  Immediate notice is required by the facility's operating
permit granted by the state of Utah, agreements with local emergency
responders, and  the Army's own standard operating procedures.

"The delay in notifying Tooele County emergency officials is unconscionable
no matter how the Army frames it," said Jason Groenewold, Director of
Families Against Incinerator Risk (FAIR), a local watchdog group. "It is
one more example of the Army's crass lack of concern for public  health and
welfare  in its rush to incinerate chemical weapons."

"Citizens groups want to know why the Army stalled for four hours before
notifying the public, and they want to know now," added Craig Williams,
national spokesperson for the Chemical Weapons  Working Group (CWWG). "The
longer it takes to get an answer the less  truth it will contain."

"The Army and its contractor EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. were on the
scene, they know exactly what happened, and they aren't talking," Williams
explained. "Our questions are straight-forward: who made the decision not
to follow the regulations and why?  The public  has a right to know now,
not in two or three weeks  after the Army's public relations teams develop
an elaborate cover story."

Col. Christopher  Lesniak, national manager of the Chemical Stockpile
Disposal Program, was visiting the Tooele site during the leak.  "Sources
tell us that Col. Lesniak overrode  local depot commander Col. Pate, who
wanted to follow procedure  by immediately notifying the public,"  Williams
revealed.   "If this information is correct Col. Lesniak has some
explaining  to do. If it's not, then he should explain for the record what
did happen."

The groups monitoring the Tooele incinerator are calling on Congress to
launch an independent investigation. "We aren't sure that the whole truth
about the nerve agent leak will ever come out, since the Army is in charge
of investigating itself," said FAIR's Groenewold. "However, there is no
doubt that the Army and EG&G ignored their legal obligation to immediately
notify local officials. They must be held accountable for this violation."

--------------------------------------------

Chemical Weapons Working Group
P.O. Box 467     Berea, KY 40403
859-986-0868 859-986-2695 (F)
kefwilli@acs.eku.edu    www.cwwg.org

for more information contact:
Jason Groenewald: (801) 364-5110
Craig Williams: (859) 986-7565
Bob Schaeffer: (941) 395-6773

for immediate release: Friday, May 19, 2000
DID ARMY NEGLIGENCE CAUSE NERVE AGENT RELEASE? DOCUMENTS SHOW REPEAT
WARNINGS OF INCINERATOR DESIGN FLAWS WHICH LED TO RELEASE IGNORED BY ARMY
IN THEIR "RUSH TO BURN"

Documents released today demonstrate that officials at the U.S. Army's
Tooele, Utah, chemical weapons incinerator repeatedly failed to address
problems with the design of that facility's deactivation furnace. A jam in
that component's feed chutes last week was the likely cause of two releases
of the nerve agent Sarin into the atmosphere on May 8.

According to reports and letters made public by groups advocating
alternatives to the incineration program, the Army knew from pilot plant
operations at Johnston Island in the Pacific and their Utah facility that
rockets had a tendency to get stuck as they were being fed into the
furnace. "Jamming of rockets has always been a serious concern, but the
Army never fixed the problem before building the Tooele incinerator," said
Jason Groenewold, Director Families Against Incinerator Risk in Salt Lake
City. "They were also told by several whistleblowers that the snags could
cause a nerve agent release, but they ignored the warnings."

According to a November 9, 1996 letter written by former Tooele incinerator
General Manager Gary Millar, "[T]he most recent problems with rocket parts
jamming in the DFS [Deactivation Furnace System] feed chutes and the
temporary fix periodically expose employees to risk . . .. to clear these
jams. Enough of these temporary or less than complete work arounds will
eventually line up to trigger a high risk event."

Recently released hand written memos and internal documents attributed to
Chief Safety Officer, Steve Jones indicate that the feed chute problems
continue to plague the plant. According to an August 10, 1999 memo,
"Yesterday the chutes jammed again . . . the procedure amazingly enough is
to drop I-Beams down the chute to dislodge rocket parts.  Well, 2 of 5
I-beams they dropped came out - 3 others stuck. They [the Army] aren't
particularly concerned about an explosion, but should be."

A July 16, 1999 Army Corrective Action Response memo identifies problems
with agent leaking from the Deactivation Furnace feed chutes. According to
the document, the corrective action is to "Fix the leak(s) in the DFS
chutes." The Army's response: "In order to accomplish the recommended
corrective action, the chutes would have to be redesigned. This is not
feasible due to the amount of downtime required."

During the nerve agent releases last week, the feed chute gates would not
close, indicating that rocket parts were most likely jammed in the chutes.
When incinerator employees tried to push the stuck material into the
furnace, nerve agent monitors in the exhaust stacks alarmed at levels
3.6-8.7 times higher than allowed under the Army's permit.

"If, as it appears, the feed chutes are the root cause of this release, the
Army can not claim it was unexpected or an anomaly," added Craig Williams,
national spokesperson for the Chemical Weapons Working Group. "For the Army
to allow nerve agent releases to occur when they were warned repeatedly
about these problems is nothing short of gross negligence."  Groenewold
concluded, "It is completely unacceptable for the Army to put cost and
schedule ahead of public and worker safety."

The Tooele incinerator design, including the feed chutes, is being used as
the model for incinerators under construction in Oregon, Alabama, and
Arkansas.

-------------------
Elizabeth Crowe
Chemical Weapons Working Group
Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition
(859) 986-0868

*NOTE NEW AREA CODE*

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