[CPEO-MEF] Unfinished business at JPG

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

In mid-November, 2001 I visited the Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG), a
former Army installation in southern Indiana, for the first time. The
51,000 acre impact area (including buffer zones) is considered too
dangerous to transfer, so the Army last year (2000) entered into
innovative agreements with both the Air Force and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service to permit limited use of the property. However, the Army has no
plans to remediate those 51,000 acres; in fact, it has conducted no
detailed investigations of the range lands, and neither the state of
Indiana nor U.S. EPA appear prepared to insist on study, let along cleanup.

In 1988 the Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended that JPG
be closed, but base workers attempted for years to reverse that
decision, warning that the financial and ecological costs of cleaning
the base would prove enormous. The base was officially shut down in 1995.

It was from those employees that I learned of the challenges of
reclaiming land polluted by unexploded ordnance (UXO). I wrote, in "The
U.S. Military's Toxic Legacy" (National Toxics Campaign Fund, 1991),
"Though portions [of JPG] are used for the testing of aerial bombs and
land mines, its primary function is to test artillery rounds, weapons
designed to explode upon impact. While some of the early records are
sketchy, the Army reports that 23 million rounds have been fired since
1941. Approximately six percent have failed to explode; they lie as far
as 25 feet underground. Those 'duds,' as well as nearly 5 million other
potentially explosive devices, may be found anywhere on the 51,700 acres
north of the base's firing line."

Nearly all of that UXO is still there. The Army's Base Environmental
Coordinator says that the Army made a decision years ago, after
publishing a voluminous consultant's report, not to clean or clear the
impact area because it would cost billions of dollars, require "strip
mining" of vast areas, and endanger cleanup crews. Thus far, I have not
found any documents formalizing the decision. In fact, I have been
unable to learn who made this decision, or under what authority it was
made. 

Meanwhile, the Army undertook remediation of the roughly 4,000-acre
cantonment area south of the firing line. That has been more costly than
originally anticipated, but the Army is gradually transferring that
portion of the former base.

The Army has retained the remainder of the installation, but it has not,
as I suggested in 1991, been forced to declare it a national sacrifice
zone. Instead, it has issued use permits to both the Air Force and Fish
and Wildlife Service.

The Air Force, primarily the Air National Guard, continues bombing
practice at a 983-acre conventional target area and a 50-acre
precision-guided munitions target. During training, only Air Force
personnel are allowed within 5,100 acres surrounding the conventional
target and 14,860 acres surrounding the precision range. The Air Force
is responsible for site security. It has not yet, however, figured out
how to follow its own guidelines on routine UXO clearance from active
ranges. Normally its explosives ordnance disposal teams clear the
surface of target areas to prepare them for training, but thus far it
has conducted no such clearance at JPG. Old Army UXO is present in
concentrations not found on Air Force ranges.

The Fish and Wildlife Service manages the rest of the old firing area -
that is, the 51,000 acres minus the bombing target areas - as the Big
Oaks National Wildlife Refuge. The Refuge carefully restricts public
access to specific portions of the refuge, allowing hunting, birding,
and tours. Visitors watch a safety video and sign a release form. The
Fish and Wildlife Service is thus able to fulfill its mission -
protecting habitat and supporting limited public use - while helping the
Army keep people out of dangerous areas.

Still, the Fish and Wildlife Service wants some sections, used regularly
by the public under permit, to be cleared for recreational use. The Amy
thus far has said no, only promising to conduct emergency removals and
to request that the Army Reserve or Army National Guard conduct
clearance activity as part of their training.

And that's the primary problem. Even if those units agree, they are not
equipped - as Army UXO removal contractors are - to use more reliable
computerized characterization systems. Large areas around the periphery
of JPG could be cleared for their intended use, safely and efficiently,
but the Army still follows it old, arbitrary decision to do nothing
because "everything" would be too difficult.

Perhaps as important, the Army is unwilling to remediate, or even study
the large quantities of depleted uranium penetrators that lie within
conventional ordnance impact areas. It is seeking a license closure from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates the radioactive
characteristics of uranium at JPG, but it's not clear who is responsible
for overseeing the toxic threat from the uranium weapons. (The Defense
Department has always asserted that the toxic hazards of depleted
uranium weapons outweigh the radioactive hazards.) Members of the
surrounding community are concerned about toxic releases of uranium,
such as surface water discharges. And they are worried that the
controlled burns that the Refuge plans will emit toxic uranium into the
air. Furthermore, no one has conducted an ecological risk assessment to
determine whether the uranium poses a threat to the Refuge's wildlife -
a task that would be standard at another military base with heavy metal contamination.

I don't know to what degree the risk would justify cleanup of the public
use areas or the uranium target areas if the Army were to conduct
remedial investigations and feasibility studies. Cleanup of all or most
of the property may turn out to be unnecessary or impractical. But those
studies have not been conducted. If fact, there is absolutely NO process
in place: Not under CERCLA (the Superfund law); not under hazardous
waste laws such as RCRA; not under internal Defense Department guidance.

Furthermore, the regulatory agencies - other than the NRC for radiation
- have not insisted upon Army action above the firing line. In this
case, "oversight" means overlooking problems, not overseeing the
response. The Indiana Department of Environmental Management appears
focused on the 4,000-acre cantonment area. U.S. EPA is reluctant to
press hard where its regulatory authority is uncertain. (Though the
impact area is not subject to EPA's CERCLA authority, EPA may be able to
assert itself under RCRA because JPG operated an open burning/open
detonation area.)

Only the neighbors are asking questions, and it's about time that the
agencies come up with answers. No one expects the full removal of
ordnance from JPG, but the Army, with regulator support, should begin
investigating areas where it appears that the risk to people or the
environment is significant and the costs are within reason.

JPG may be a worst case, but it illustrates the need nationally for a
clear regulatory framework to address UXO and other hazards at former ranges.

-- 


Lenny Siegel
Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
c/o PSC, 222B View St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
lsiegel@cpeo.org
http://www.cpeo.org

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~