[CPEO-MEF] Phosgene in uranium storage cylinders

[Lenny Siegel <lennysiegel@gmail.com>]

Nuclear Safety: DOE's Investigation of Phosgene Gas Contamination Was 
Inadequate, but Experts Conclude That Worker Safety and Facilities Are 
Not Threatened  GAO-07-712  May 31, 2007  (36 pages)

Summary

More than 700,000 tons of uranium are stored at two Department of Energy 
(DOE) sites where uranium enrichment took place and where two facilities 
are being constructed to treat depleted uranium. Some of the storage 
cylinders for uranium came from the Army more than 50 years ago and may 
originally have contained phosgene, a toxic gas used as a chemical 
weapon in World War I. In September 2005, DOE's Inspector General issued 
an alert warning that residual phosgene, if present, could threaten the 
safety of people and the treatment facilities. GAO was directed to 
review DOE's investigation of possible phosgene contamination of uranium 
storage cylinders. GAO consulted a panel of experts to assess the 
adequacy of DOE's investigation and whether possible phosgene 
contamination could threaten the new treatment facilities under 
construction.

According to members of GAO's expert panel, although DOE adequately 
demonstrated that the public would not be harmed if small amounts of 
phosgene escaped from the storage cylinders, it neglected to explicitly 
document its analysis of worker safety in its investigation of possible 
phosgene contamination. DOE's regulations and guidance call for thorough 
safety analyses of newly identified hazards, such as possible phosgene 
contamination, to protect workers and the public. Yet DOE assumed, 
without explicitly documenting, that existing worker safety procedures 
were adequate to protect workers from the possible presence of phosgene. 
After GAO identified the need for DOE to support this key assumption, 
DOE provided supplemental information on worker safety; GAO's panel 
agreed that this supplement sufficiently supported DOE's position. In 
addition, although DOE's guidance calls for independent review of 
investigation results, DOE officials supervising the phosgene 
investigation also served as reviewers. This lack of independent review 
may have contributed to weaknesses in the investigation. The experts GAO 
consulted agreed that, for two reasons, the facilities under 
construction in Ohio and Kentucky would not be threatened by possible 
phosgene contamination of uranium storage cylinders. First, at the start 
of treatment operations, cylinders containing depleted uranium will be 
placed inside pressure vessels designed to withstand and contain any 
leak from a cylinder. If phosgene were present, it would not affect 
either the pressure vessels or the treatment facilities. Second, during 
subsequent steps, any phosgene that may be processed with the depleted 
uranium would be destroyed by the extreme heat and water vapor applied 
during the treatment process.



For the original version of this summary with links to the full report, 
see http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/details.php?rptno=GAO-07-712

--


Lenny Siegel
Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
c/o PSC, 278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org


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