[CPEO-MEF] Defense Science Board report: "More Fight, Less Fuel"

[Lenny Siegel <lennysiegel@gmail.com>]

[To download the full, formatted report, go to
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-02-ESTF.pdf]


Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy
"More Fight – Less Fuel"

February 2008
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 2, 2006 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) directed the Defense Science Board 
to create a Task Force to examine DoD Energy Strategy. Citing 
significant risks to both our nation and our military forces, he 
challenged the Task Force to find opportunities to reduce DOD's energy 
demand, identify institutional obstacles to their implementation, and 
assess their potential commercial and security benefits to the nation.

Overview

Based on its study and deliberations, the Task Force concluded that DoD 
faces two primary energy challenges:

* Unnecessarily high and growing battlespace fuel demand that:
     ** compromises operational capability and mission success;
     ** requires an excessive support force structure at the expense of 
operational forces;
     ** creates more risk for support operations than necessary; and
     ** increases life-cycle operations and support costs.
* Almost complete dependence of military installations on a fragile and 
vulnerable commercial power grid and other critical national 
infrastructure places critical military and Homeland defense missions at 
an unacceptably high risk of extended disruption.

These observations lead to the following set of findings and 
recommendations.

Finding #1: The recommendations from the 2001 Defense Science Board Task 
Force Report "More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden" have 
not been implemented.

The main Task Force recommendation in 2001 was that DoD re-engineer its 
business processes to make energy a factor in the key Departmental 
decisions that establish requirements, shape acquisition programs and 
set funding priorities. This was based on their findings that these 
decisions were not informed about their energy consequences, yet 
ultimately drove operational fuel demand, and that high fuel demand 
compromised operational effectiveness. This Task Force finds these 
situations have not changed.

Finding #2: Critical national security and Homeland defense missions are 
at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid.

In addition to their warfighting responsibilities, installations have 
taken on significantly expanded Homeland defense missions. Installations 
now serve as a base of operations to coordinate the full range of 
national relief and recovery efforts; and a source of skilled personnel 
to provide rescue, recovery, medical and other emergency services 
required by survivors. They rely almost entirely on the national power 
grid and other critical national infrastructure, which is highly 
vulnerable to prolonged outage from a variety of threats, placing 
critical missions at unacceptably high risk of extended disruption. 
Backup power is often based on diesel generator sets with limited 
on-site fuel storage, undersized for new Homeland defense missions, not 
prioritized to critical loads, and inadequate in duration and reliability.

Finding #3: The Department lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, 
information, and governance structure necessary to properly manage its 
energy risks.

Decisions that create energy demand are dispersed organizationally 
across the Department and throughout the Services. There is no unifying 
vision, strategy, metrics or governance structure with enterprise-wide 
energy in its portfolio. Information collected about energy end-use is 
inadequate for the purposes of establishing a baseline, establishing 
metrics or making management decisions. DoD efforts to manage energy are 
currently limited to complying with executive orders, legislation and 
regulations which are mostly limited to facilities, non-tactical fleet 
vehicles, purchase of renewable energy from utilities, and procurement 
of commercial products. There is a senior political appointee 
responsible for these activities, which encompass about a quarter of DoD 
energy consumption. There are currently few efforts to manage energy 
demand by operational forces, which consume about three quarters of DoD 
energy, perhaps because no one is in charge. The lowest organizational 
level where all decisions that drive DoD energy use come together is the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, implying the need for a senior energy 
official, and oversight of the Department's energy strategy and program 
by the Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG).

Finding #4: There are technologies available now to make DoD systems 
more energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their 
implementation and resulting in inadequate future S&T investments.

The Task Force heard over a hundred presentations on technologies that 
addressed all categories of end use, covering the full range of maturity 
from basic research to ready-to-implement. Many appear quite promising, 
but DoD lacks accepted tools to value their operational and economic 
benefits. As a result, cost effective technologies are not adopted, 
science and technology programs significantly under-invest in efficiency 
relative to its potential value, and competitive prototyping to 
accelerate deployment of efficiency technologies is not done.

Finding #5: There are many opportunities to reduce energy demand by 
changing wasteful operational practices and procedures.

Operational practices and procedures affect energy consumption by 
aircraft, land vehicles, ships, installations, forward operating bases 
(FOBs), and battery powered equipment carried by individual soldiers. 
The Task Force found no strong, sustained focus by senior leadership to 
change the culture that assumes readily available energy, or to create a 
culture that inherently recognizes the clear linkage between energy 
productivity and combat effectiveness. The Task Force found this to be 
one of the most significant barriers to changing wasteful practices.

Finding #6: Operational risks from fuel disruption require demand-side 
remedies; mission risks from electricity disruption to installations 
require both demand- and supply-side remedies.

Moving fuel to deployed forces has proven to be a high risk operation. 
Reducing operational fuel demand is the single best means to reduce that 
risk, but DoD is not currently equipped to make informed decisions on 
the most effective way to do so. Fixed installations are 99% dependent 
on the commercial power grid and other critical national infrastructure, 
which is fragile and vulnerable and poses serious risks to critical 
missions. Significantly increased end-use efficiency to reduce demand 
combined with alternative energy generated nearby or on-site offer the 
best opportunities to reduce that risk to acceptable levels.

Recommendation #1: Accelerate efforts to implement energy efficiency Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) and use the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
(FBCF), to inform all acquisition trades and analyses about their energy 
consequences, as recommended by the 2001 Task Force.

The Task Force recognizes two key initiatives recently launched by the 
Joint Staff (JS) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 
implement the 2001 Task Force recommendations:

  An August 17, 2006, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) 
memorandum (JROCM 161-06) endorsing a Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) decision to establish an Energy Efficiency Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP). An April 10, 2007 USD(AT&L) memorandum 
establishing Department policy to use the "fully burdened cost of fuel" 
(FBCF) for all acquisition trade analyses.

While these are essential reforms, little progress has been made in 
implementing them and little action has been taken to develop the 
necessary analytical capabilities to establish meaningful values for 
either initiative. The Task Force recommends that the Department 
accelerate the following tasks:

* Build fuel logistics into campaign analyses and other analytical 
models and simulations to inform the requirements process of the 
operational, force structure and cost consequences of varying 
battlespace fuel demand;
* Establish outcome-based energy KPPs; and
* Use FBCF as a factor in all Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) / 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EoAs) and throughout all acquisition trades.

The Task Force recommends these apply to all actions that create demand 
for energy, including "black" programs, and non-developmental systems 
used at forward operating locations.

Recommendation #2: Reduce the risk to critical missions at fixed 
installations from loss of commercial power and other critical national 
infrastructure.

The Task Force recommends DoD launch a comprehensive program to mitigate 
mission risk using an integrated risk management approach, based on 
importance of missions, likelihood and duration of outage, and cost 
effectiveness of risk management options. The Department should take 
immediate actions to "island" the installations listed in Appendix G and 
increase the efficiency of critical equipment to reduce the burden for 
backup systems. Successfully executing this program will require a joint 
effort by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), the Mission Assurance Division 
at Dahlgren, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Environment) (ODUSD(I&E)) and the Services.

Recommendation #3: Establish a Department-wide strategic plan that 
establishes measurable goals, achieves the business process changes 
recommended by the 2001 DSB report and establishes clear responsibility 
and accountability.

Fixed installations use about one quarter of DOD's total energy. There 
are policies, metrics, reporting requirements and a senior official in 
charge. Deployed systems use about three quarters of DOD's total energy. 
There are few policies, procedures or reporting requirements; no metrics 
and no one in charge. The lowest level at which all decisions affecting 
energy use by the Department converge is with the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense. It is very difficult to achieve sustained focus and 
accountability for performance on energy use at this level. The Task 
Force concluded that lack of leadership is a root cause of DOD's energy 
problem.

In addition to oversight, DoD needs a comprehensive energy plan that 
addresses both fixed installations, to include critical Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) plants, and operational forces. It should include 
both measurable goals for energy demand reduction and reduction in 
energy risks. Implementing new analytical products to better inform key 
decisions will be essential to enabling effective energy management. For 
operational forces, this requires adding energy to force planning 
analyses, and implementing the energy KPP and FBCF. For fixed 
installations and industrial base plants, it includes applying 
integrated risk management principles to reduce the likelihood of 
prolonged loss of critical missions due to commercial power and other 
critical national infrastructure outages.

These basic business process changes will enable the Department to more 
effectively manage the amount of fuel and electricity it requires to 
accomplish its missions and reduce its risk from supply disruptions.

Recommendation #4: Invest in energy efficient and alternative energy 
technologies to a level commensurate with their operational and 
financial value.

The same lack of analytical tools that prevent the requirements and 
acquisition processes from developing more efficient systems also 
prevent science and technology investments from identifying the most 
effective investments in energy efficiency technologies. Investments 
should be guided by a common understanding of their operational, force 
structure and cost value, but the tools and business processes needed to 
establish this understanding do not exist. The Task Force recommends 
USD(AT&L) accelerate development efforts on the following innovative 
concepts based on the Task Force's qualitative assessment:
* Blended Wing Body Aircraft
* Variable Speed Tilt Rotor Vertical Lift
* Lightweight Composite 'Blast-Bucket' Tactical Vehicle
* Advanced electro-mechanical actuators
* Semi-rigid, lighter-than-air high altitude lifting bodies
* Advanced micro-generators
* Biomimetic design for platform components
* Very high efficiency electronics for soldier systems (National 
Research Council recommendation) and other combat systems applications

The Task Force also recommends USD(AT&L) re-establish early competitive 
prototyping for key Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) programs to 
accelerate the adoption of high payoff, innovative energy efficient 
technologies and concepts.

The Task Force recommends the Department invest in basic research to 
develop new fuels technologies that are too risky for private 
investments and to partner with private sector fuel users to leverage 
efforts and share burdens. The Task Force also recommends the Department 
work with commercial partners to conduct full "well-to- wheel" life 
cycle assessments of each synthetic fuel technology under consideration. 
  This is to fully assess environmental, cost, material flow and 
scalability issues. Synfuel production technologies that can be adapted 
to forward deployed locations using local materials (such as bio-waste) 
would be valuable because it would directly reduce the amount of fuel 
that would have to be moved and protected in theater.

Recommendation #5: Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to 
reduce energy use through policies and incentives that change 
operational procedures.

Since WWII, energy has been abundant and cheap, with the exceptions of 
two short periods during the 1970s and 1980s, and very recently. During 
WWII, tankers moving fuel to U.S. forces were attacked, and the response 
was to devise ways to avoid using tanker ships, such as building 
pipelines to mitigate the risk. During Korea and Vietnam, energy 
security was not a concern. Changing a culture that considers energy 
cheap and abundant is one of the most difficult challenges facing the 
Department and the nation. The business changes recommended by the Task 
Force will take time to show results, but changing operational practices 
to conserve energy can show immediate results.

Leadership sets the tone. The Task Force recommends the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and the VCJCS direct all Components to review 
current practices to identify opportunities to reduce energy use, to 
include expanded use of simulators, emulators and task trainers; and 
limiting afterburner use; that can be enacted without affecting 
operations and provide incentives to save energy throughout the 
Department. Regular reviews of actions taken and their results across 
Components will help track progress and validate techniques.


-- 


Lenny Siegel
Executive Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
a project of the Pacific Studies Center
278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org



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