[CPEO-MEF] BIOWEAPONS: Laboratory Expansion Questioned

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

Postal Anthrax Aftermath: Has Biodefense Spending Made Us Safer?
The Anthrax attacks in 2001 led to a massive increase in biodefense 
funding, which critics claim has done more harm than good

By John Dudley Miller
Scientific American
November 6, 2008

As the Federal Bureau of Investigation was about to move in, U.S. Army 
biodefense scientist Bruce Ivins committed suicide, thus possibly 
closing the chapter on the first - and so far only - fatal bioattack in 
U.S. history. The FBI alleges that Ivins, who worked at the U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort 
Detrick, Md., mailed anthrax-laden letters in September and October 2001 
that killed five people. The incidents sparked a massive infusion of 
research funds to counter civilian bioterrorism, $41 billion spread over 
seven federal departments and agencies. Yet some observers argue that 
those funds have done little to guard against another bioterror 
incident, especially if the FBI is right about Ivins.

In an opinion that echoes those of several public health scientists, 
Keith Rhodes, the Government Accountability Office's chief technologist, 
told a congressional hearing in October 2007 that "we are at greater 
risk today" than before of an infectious disease epidemic because of the 
great increase in biolaboratories and the absence of oversight they 
receive. In the past six years, says Rutgers University microbiologist 
Richard Ebright, "the Bush administration has driven a 20- to 30-fold 
increase in the number of institutions and individuals with access to 
live, virulent bioweapons agents," to about 400 institutions and 15,000 
people. Every one of them, he claims, "is a potential source of an 
attack like the 2001 attack." Even before the expansion, some 100 
scientists had access to the anthrax strain Ivins managed. Moreover, 
huge growth "multiplies the chance of an accidental release," argues 
Hillel Cohen, an epidemiologist at the Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine in New York City.

...

For the entire article, see
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=postal-anthrax-aftermath&print=true

--


Lenny Siegel
Executive Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
a project of the Pacific Studies Center
278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org



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