[CPEO-MEF] CHEMWEAPONS: The challenge of destroying Syria's stockpile

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

The Russian proposal to control and dispose of Syrian chemical  
weapons has already helped defuse the rush to another American War in  
the Middle East, and if implemented it should reduce the risk of  
lethal chemical attacks locally and regionally. While President  
Obama's threat to attack Syria got everyone's attention, I believe  
the principal basis of the Russian proposal is Russian self-interest,  
not the prospect of "limited" cruise missile attacks on the Syrian  
military.

If the diplomats work out the principles for sequestering and  
eliminating Syrian chemical warfare materiel, the hard work begins.  
The destruction of the U.S. chemical stockpile, non-stockpile  
weapons, and productions facilities has take more than two decades,  
cost billions of dollars, and remains incomplete. But we've learned a  
lot in the process.

Technologies exist for safe demilitarization and disposal of both  
chemical munitions and bulk chemical agent, so in the rush to  
eliminate these weapons, there is no need to just blow them up. Also,  
given the both the security and environmental risks, transportation  
of lethal munitions and agent should be minimized or at least  
carefully weighed. The immediate task should be to send to Syria  
proven mobile equipment which can be operated where small stockpiles  
are located. Then larger fixed facilities, perhaps at the site of  
Syria's chemical weapons production facilities, should be designed to  
dispose of larger quantities.

Care should be taken to prevent the release of chemical agent and  
products of incomplete combustion such as dioxins, as well as to  
reduce the likelihood of system failure, but no one expects the  
volume of regulatory paperwork associated with the U.S. destruction  
program. Again, much has been learned globally over the past two  
decades about how to safely, if not economically, do away with the  
chemical threat.

The initial focus should be on chemical munitions and bulk chemical  
agent, but over time plans must also be made to dismantle production  
facilities, as well as to dispose of hazardous chemical feedstocks  
(if they are still present) and the waste products of treatment.

If practical, the Syrian people who live near storage sites,  
transportation routes, and destruction facilities should be informed  
and given the opportunity to comment on disposal plans. But in the  
midst of a vicious civil war, in a county with weak experience in  
democratic participation, such public participation is probably a  
pipe dream.

So I suggest that the demilitarization process be transparent in real  
time, with cameras documenting key activities for either live or  
delayed streaming to the Internet. Such transparency could establish  
confidence, globally as well as locally, that Syrian weapons are  
indeed being destroyed and that the disposal process is not  
threatening the health and safety of the nearby population. They have  
enough to worry about.

Lenny

--

Lenny Siegel
Executive Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
a project of the Pacific Studies Center
278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org

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