From: | Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@igc.org> |
Date: | Thu, 03 Oct 1996 10:04:58 -0700 (PDT) |
Reply: | cpeo-military |
Subject: | FUTURE LAND USE COMMENTS |
From: Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@igc.org> The following are my draft comments on the Department of Defense's (DoD's) draft policy on "Responsibility for Environmental Cleanup due to Changes in Land Use after Transfer," which I summarized in a posting on Wednesday, October 2. I am looking for feedback before I formally submit my comments to the Cleanup office later his month. Lenny Siegel I believe that the Department of Defense draft policy, "Responsibility for Environmental Cleanup due to Changes in Land Use after Transfer," has fundamental shortcomings that will in many cases seriously limit the use and reduce the value of former military properties. When a community with land use planning jurisdiction and a transferee (which may be the same entity) accept institutional controls, in lieu of cleanup, they are letting the military "off the hook." Should the land use needs of the community and transferee change, I believe that the military has the responsibility to remediate the property to a level which is fully protective under the new land use or at least to the condition of the property when the military first gained ownership or control. I am willing to make an exception, however, when the terms of transfer - such as a discount in purchase price or a conveyance of infrastructure or buildings - compensate the transferee up front for the putative cost of cleanup, assuming that the planning jurisdiction approves of those terms. This approach is both fair and practical. It is FAIR because it holds the polluter accountable for its mistakes. It is PRACTICAL in two ways: First, it allows the military to hold down costs by allowing natural attenuation to take place during the period of institutional controls. By the time the community seeks further cleanup, cleanup may have happened on its own. Second, communities are much more likely to accept institutional controls in lieu of full remediation when they know that the Defense Department is prepared to complete the job if and when that is necessary. I am not so naive, however, to expect the Defense Department to agree voluntarily to this position. Therefore, I offer the following specific suggestions for modifying the draft policy. 1. Institutional controls should be accepted in lieu of cleanup only if those controls reinforce land use decisions made by the community and accepted by the transferee. Those decisions should be made through normal local channels, with full public participation. That is, only the local community, not the Defense Department, should make the decisions to restrict future land use. In fact, the Defense Department and its components should be prohibited from arguing for land use restrictions simply for the purpose of saving money on cleanup, with the exception of projects where cleanup is prohibitively expensive. Full disclosure is not enough. There is a big difference between cleaning up reuse and letting inadequate cleanup determine reuse, particularly since uses compatible with residual contamination tend to use and release hazardous substances themselves. 2. When contaminated property remains in federal ownership and is thus subject to institutional controls based upon land use decisions beyond the control of the local community, the Department of Defense should commit to return to complete additional cleanup (of its own contamination) should the property subsequently be transferred to the local community for a use beyond the federal institutional controls. This is clearly a concern in my community, at the former Moffett Naval Air Station, where institutional controls are being established consistent with NASA's continuing operation of the airfield. Should NASA abandon the airfield, additional study and different remedies may be necessary. We need an assurance that such activity will be funded and that the community will not be forced to accept the current use indefinitely or pay for cleanup that is rightly the responsibility of the federal government. At some sites, however, the community is likely to support institutional controls that are consistent with our future use objectives. 3. Where institutional controls on land use have been applied because remediation is technically impractical, prohibitively expensive, or environmentally hazardous, the Department of Defense should be prepared, upon request from the community or transferee, to return to carry out additional cleanup should new technologies be developed to overcome those obstacles. For example, on most properties contaminated with unexploded ordnance, institutional controls make sense. However, as new methods of investigation, clearance, and disposal are perfected, it will be possible to remediate (or simply determine safe) vast areas for less restricted or even unrestricted use. Under DoD's draft policy, there is no mechanism to trigger such activity. 4. The draft policy should specifically list Indian tribes along with state and federal regulatory agencies. I hope this is just an oversight. Not only should tribes' interests always be acknowledged in such documents, but their close connection to their remaining lands requires special attention. While people whose families have arrived on the continent within the last few hundred years usually can move away from contamination, native people's identity and culture is tied to both land ownership and customary subsistence rights. I don't propose holding the military accountable for all of its contamination simply because the Pentagon has deep pockets. Most military bases were given to, sold cheaply to, or taken by the armed services in good condition. In fairness, their condition should be returned to their initial level of safety. Community people, however, are willing to accept less than complete remediation should institutional controls provide safe use of the property, or portions thereof, based upon the community's own use plan. However, there is serious reason to be concerned that some military officials will continue to argue against cleaning up to meet the standards based upon community-developed reuse plans, simply as a way to save money on cleanup. This will condemn a number of communities to uses which do not meet their economic needs - such as sham wildlife preserves - or which perpetuate various forms of pollution - such as heavy industry or civilian airports. In fact, the military may find local allies that are willing to use the military's preference for institutional controls to force undesirable land use choices on the rest of community. That is not the same as community-based reuse planning. Communities are more than willing to propose or support institutional controls that save DoD time and money, but where those controls undermine local control of long-term land use, their level of cooperation drops dramatically. |
Follow-Ups
|
Prev by Date: FUTURE LAND USE POLICY Next by Date: Kudo's to USEPA Region IX and X re Regional Forum | |
Prev by Thread: FUTURE LAND USE POLICY Next by Thread: Re: FUTURE LAND USE COMMENTS |