Reprint of Article in ICMA Base Reuse Consortium Bulletin

[Aimee Houghton <aimeeh@cpeo.org>]

CITY VOICE NEEDED IN BASE CLEANUP
by Saul Bloom and Eve Bach

as printed in the International City/County Management
Association Base Reuse Consortium ---BULLETIN---, pages 5-10,
November/December 1997, Volume 2, Issue 4.

<<<editor's note begins>>>*********

The following article was written by Saul Bloom and Eve Bach
from Arc Ecology. Arc Ecology is a public interest, nonprofit
organization concerned with the environmental economic,
societal, and geostrategic effects of military activities and
policies. Arc Ecology maintains a staff of environmental
analysts, economist/planners, and community organizers. Arc
Ecology has been involved in the military toxics and base
cleanup issue since 1984. Arc provides technical support to
grassroots base cleanup campaigns in the San Francisco Bay Area,
California, the United States, Philippines, England, Wales,
Scotland, and Okinawa. Arc is represented on six restoration
advisory boards in the San Francisco Bay Area, two local reuse
advisory committees, the East Bay Conversion and Reinvestment
Commission, and the California EPA Base Closures Environmental
Advisory Group.

***********<<<editor's note ends>>>

One of the most important challenges confronting cities with
closing military installations is finding effective ways to
influence base cleanup outcomes. Under the existing system,
military authorities and regulators negotiate the timing, pace,
standards, rigor, and costs of base cleanup. The military has
the option of informally consulting with city officials, and
individuals can apply to serve on the Restoration Advisory Board
(RAB) that advises the military and regulators. There is no
formal provision, however, for an official, publicly accountable
local voice to participate in shaping cleanup outcomes.

The only role for local government explicitly acknowledged
within the cleanup process is the development and enactment of
the base reuse plan to guide DOD base cleanup goals.
Increasingly, however, the Defense Department (DOD) expects
local reuse to accommodate, rather than drive the military's
objectives for a base's cleanup.

Local community values need to inform cleanup technical
assessments. For instance, determining the extent of
contamination requires judgments about how deep and wide to
search. Cleanup remedies need to respect the community
tolerances for risk and impact.

Trusting military and regulatory decisionmakers to independently
agree on the alternatives that meet city needs is a risky
strategy because both embrace cost avoidance objectives.

<<<sidebar begins>>>***********

The Navy is proposing to convey Mare Island housing with lead
exceeding Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) standards. Despite the probable
non-concurrence of regulators, community concerns, and potential
liability exposure for the City of Vallejo, the current cleanup
process leaves the City with few options but to accept the
contaminated property, or delay reuse.

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

REDUCTIONS COMPROMISE PROGRAM

DOD annual reports to Congress provide insight into priorities
for the base cleanup program. When the thousand-page documents
count completed cleanups, they do not distinguish cleanups that
remove toxic wastes, from cleanups that require management of
continuing toxics with use restrictions. This disinterest in
program quality depicts an organizational culture that rewards
cost avoidance over programmatic goals.

The GAO has pointed out that reduction of cleanup expenses comes
at the expense of cleanup program goals by (1)increasing
environmental risk, (2)delaying schedules, and (3)clouding
liability. <<US General Accounting Office, Military Base
Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup Requires
Difficult Choices, (GAO/NSIAD-96-172, September 5, 1996) and
Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds,
(GAO/NSIAD-97-151)>>

1.---Increased Environmental Risk---

In 1990, Defense officials promised that bases would be
remediated to "highest, most practical levels." By 1993 the
objective dropped to remediation consistent with planned reuse.
At about this same time, allocations of scarce DoD cleanup
dollars began to favor reuse plans consistent with lower cleanup
levels.

Last summer, DOD persuaded Congress to pass the "Dirty Transfer
Amendment," modifying CERCLA to allow cleanup after property
transfer.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************

At San Francisco's Hunters Point Shipyard, the Navy and
regulators negotiated an agreement to remediate soils to 10-foot
depths, with deed restrictions on disturbing deeper soils. The
restrictions are needed because the agreement leaves in place
significant contamination below ten feet. At one site, the
highest concentrations of trichloroethylene (TCE) are found at
11-12 feet. The City's Public Works Department plans to dig
30-foot utility trenches through some of the contaminated areas.

Left undisturbed, the TCE poses no immediate threat to human
health, but it will transform over time into vinyl chloride, a
carcinogenic gas that will recontaminate the soil above and
tends to collect in basements and under pavement.

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

2.---Delay---

DOD is looking to cost deferral as a pivotal economizing
measure. A comparison of their 1995 and 1996 reports to Congress
<< US Department of Defense, Defense Environmental Restoration
Program: 1996 Annual Report to Congress, Volume 2, 1997; also
report for 1995 and 1994>> reveals that expenditures for closing
bases are being reprogrammed to occur after 2001, the expiration
date of the special budget account for those bases. (See Table
A.) Although overall cleanup costs (1995-completion) did not
change, the scheduling of these expenditures changed
dramatically. 1997-2001 expenses projected in 1996 are 30% lower
than forecasts made a year earlier; costs scheduled after 2001
increased by 92%. This backloading of costs to the out years is
most extreme for the three earlier rounds of base closures;
their 1997-2001 cleanup costs diminished by 47%, while post-2001
costs increased by 164%.

DOD's backloading policy translates into specific budget cuts
that cause delay:

---Reallocation of 1/3 of Treasure Island's (San Francisco) 1997
cleanup budget to Bosnia military operations eight months into
the fiscal year;

---Bases guaranteed only 70% of their budget requests;

---Cleanup funding provided only for sites with developers;

---Cleanup funds released to the region only after contracts have been 
signed.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*************

Mare Island Navy officials' requests for $35 million in FY1998
generated a "target budget" of only $22 million.

In 1997 a "target budget" of $26 million led to a "guaranteed
budget" (@ 70%) of $18 million, that ultimately provided only
$16 million.

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

3.---Clouding Liability---

One of the strengths of base cleanup until now has been the
certainty of DOD responsibility for cleanup, which has prevented
the kinds of disputes about liability that paralyze private
Super Fund cleanups. The "Dirty Transfer Amendment" introduces
ambiguity and conflict.

Attorney generals of six states, accounting for almost 1/3 of
the closing bases, opposed the amendment. They are concerned
about the liability exposures created for state and local
government. (See sidebar)

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************

ATTORNEY GENERALS' ON DIRTY TRANSFER AMENDMENT

 "Notwithstanding the protestations to the contrary from federal
agencies (including the EPA), I firmly believe it eviscerates
our communities' and states' protection from future
liability..."(Dan Morales, Texas)

 "The proposed language allowing pre-cleanup transfers does not
contain the safeguards necessary to ensure that the states and
their citizens are not saddled with the cleanup of former
federal sites... Case law poses an additional barrier...Once the
federal government has transferred property, states could be
foreclosed from ensuring that federal agencies address past
contamination..." (Gale Norton, Colorado and Daniel Lungren,
California)

 "Federal agencies are supporting Section 346 because they say
they should be treated like private sector property
owners...that it is unfair to make them clean up their property
before transfer because private owners are not subject to the
same requirement. However, federal agencies often assert
defenses unique to the government, such as Sovereign Immunity,
the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the Unitary Executive Theory."
(Christine O. Gregoire, Washington and Hubert H. Humphrey III,
Minnesota)

 "Forcing the state or local agency to make a choice between
accepting the land and the liability of the United States, or
losing the chance for economic redevelopment of the site by
declining to accept such liability, is unfair... Allowing
federal agencies to transfer their environmental liability to
others in the name of economic development will increase the
number of orphan sites of contamination when the transferee is
either unwilling, or more likely unable, to fulfill the
'assurance' it gave to remediate the federal facility." (Frank
J. Kelley, Michigan)

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

THE ROLE OF REGULATORS

Regulators generally have difficulty negotiating quality back
into the program. In 43 states, the main responsibility for
regulating base cleanup has been delegated to state agencies by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Nonetheless, the
military has challenged state authority, especially at bases not
included on the National Priorities List (i.e., SuperFund List).
At some bases, the military and state regulators have entered
into Federal Facilities Site Remediation Agreements to clarify
these issues, however the process of developing such agreements
for California bases foundered in 1995 and has only recently
resumed.

Furthermore, DOD funding reductions are forcing state regulatory
agencies to cut program. In California the 1997 Defense State
Memorandum of Agreement decreased funding by 25%. Commensurate
reductions in the regulatory program have included the
elimination of the base closure office, the management team, and
reductions in legal, toxicological, water resources, and public
support capacity. These cutbacks occurred as many sites were at
a point in the process requiring more intensive attention, and
additional sites were coming into the pipeline. Higher workloads
and fewer regulators have generated pressure to close out cases
quickly and cheaply by avoiding conflict.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************

The lack of a site remediation agreement at the Alameda Naval
Air Station prolonged a yearlong deadlock between the Navy and
California regulators over risk assessment methodologies.
Despite the state agency's strong legal position, the Navy
claims they can substitute less protective federal site
screening procedures. Strong criticism by the RAB, and the local
reuse authority has led to a temporary truce that calls for
using both procedures. If results suggest different cleanup
plans, the Navy could resume the conflict. If cleanup fails to
meet local standards, there could be substantial liability for
the next owner of the site who clearly will be subject to state
standards.

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

UNPREDICTABLE COSTS

Compounding problems of cost reductions and delays are the
swings in cost projections. Congress, cities, and potential
buyers of dirty transfer real estate need to be able to
anticipate cleanup costs. It does not appear the DOD can yet
make reliable projections. A comparison of costs to complete Bay
Area base cleanups as estimated in 1995, 1996, and 1997 shows
great fluctuations. (See graph)

ROOTS OF INADEQUATE CLEANUP FUNDING FOR CLOSING BASES

When Congress approved the Base Realignment and Adjustment
Commission's (BRAC) 1991 recommendations, they established a
special budget account to pay the costs of closing bases, of
constructing new facilities at bases where functions were being
consolidated, of moving personnel from closing to expanding
bases, and of addressing environmental problems on closing
bases. The budget for cleaning up closing bases was moved into
this new BRAC account to accelerate cleanup and to foster reuse
objectives.

This entire BRAC account will expire in 2001, the Congressional
deadline for completion of closures and consolidations.
Unfortunately, Congress did not mandate a deadline for
completing environmental remediation of the closed bases. DOD
currently expects that closed bases will still require
environmental expenditures of $3.3 billion when the BRAC account
expires in 2001.

Cleanup will not be completed until long after 2001 because the
program has not been adequately funded, not surprising since the
engine driving the BRAC process is the quest for savings.
Defense Secretary William Cohen << Wall Street Journal, "Perry
Hails Efficiency from Consolidation of the Defense Sector,"
December 20, 1996.>>and his predecessor William Perry
<<---Economist---, "The Timid Colossus," May 24, 1997>> have
stated that closures' savings are needed to pay for new weapon
systems.

These savings are not materializing on schedule, in part because
of flaws in the model used to forecast them. DOD recommendations
to the BRAC Commission for each round of base closures used
projections that did not include environmental remediation
costs. DOD argued that they would be responsible for these costs
whether the bases closed or remained active, but they neglected
to account for the incremental costs of the accelerated cleanup
promised to Congress.

After Congress approved the closures (based in part on the
optimistic projection of savings), the Department prepared
budget requests that include cleanup costs as a BRAC expense.
This "additional" expense has been blamed for the disappointing
savings of base closure. Delays in base property sales caused by
inadequate cleanup funding have created revenue shortfalls, also
undermining BRAC's ability to generate net savings. The combined
impact of the actual costs, DOD's low priority for full
cleanups, and the unrealistic expectations of an ill informed
Congress feed the funding crisis.

IMMEDIATE IMPACTS OF DELAYED CLEANUP

As it has become apparent that closed bases will remain under
federal ownership for extended periods, localities have had to
confront major problems:

---Military buildings, roads, and utilities do not comply with
codes, but leasing does not support major rehabilitation and
replacement;

---Local governments need to supplement maintenance and public
safety services beyond military caretaker levels without benefit
of property tax revenues.

---Toxics, known and unknown, necessitate restrictive lease
conditions.

---Conventional redevelopment financing mechanisms, such as tax
anticipation bonds depending on private ownership of real
estate.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************

In their desperation to assure that Naval Station Treasure
Island would have utility service after the naval base closed
this fall, San Francisco agreed to take over operations and
maintenance. The agreement exposes the City to liabilities for
compliance with the Clean Water Act that the agreement
specifically does not allow them to control. The City's elected
officials are balking at provision of police services that would
draw police from elsewhere in the city.

**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

LONG TERM ISSUES FOR CITIES

In contrast to the military and regulators, cities have a
compelling interest in cleanup quality. Cities need thorough
environmental remedies informed by community values. They need
timely, non-disruptive cleanup plans that reflect rigorous
investigation and analysis.

Implementation of institutional controls, preferred by DOD to toxics removal
typically generate substantial long term costs for other agencies and
jurisdictions. Most cities must add capacity to police strict land use
restrictions, and the potential liability for lapses can be substantial.

Lower cleanup standards that necessitate long term use restrictions hinder
base redevelopment:
---Land values are lower because a narrower range of allowable land uses
hampers flexible response to changing market conditions in the short term,
and adaptive reuse over time.
---Construction costs increase when there are restrictions on disturbing the
soil, and when construction workers require certification as hazardous waste
operators.
Properties are locked into narrower market demand.
---The long term liability of the city to third party complaints is
inversely proportional to the thoroughness of the investigation and cleanup
of the site.
---Underlying all these issues are the potential increased public health
risks -- often unarticulated or unknown -- to neighbors and new users.

RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARDS -- A LIMITED LOCAL VOICE
Although local interests are very different from DOD's, the only official
community participation in the cleanup decisionmaking is the Restoration
Advisory Board (RAB). Advisory to the Base Cleanup Team (military and
regulators), it includes community members. The Presidential Order that
established the RABs encouraged community members to report back to their
communities, but no rules or procedures promote or assist such 
accountability.

Although the self-perceived effectiveness of RABs varies considerably, many
community members share certain frustrations: difficulty in obtaining
cleanup documents, limited opportunities for input before cleanup decisions
are made, and military expectations that community members should support
military decisions rather than question them. RAB members have no access to
the document most influential in determining cleanup outcomes (the Record of
Decision) while it is still in draft form. Astonished members of several
California RABs learned that their written comments on cleanup documents
were not part of the official record.

Important opportunities exist for local governments to strengthen the
effectiveness and accountability of RABs. Systematic communication can link
the efforts of RABs, city managers and elected officials in a collaboration
to evaluate and improve cleanup decisions.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************
Almost two years ago, the Mare Island (Vallejo California) RAB discovered
that the Navy was preparing to cap, rather than remove soil with radioactive
wastes as they had previously planned. The combined efforts of the RAB,
City, state legislators, and the Congressional Representative eventually
persuaded the Navy to implement their original plans.
**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************
***************************************************
Navy cleanup funds paid for the abatement of friable asbestos in Oakland's
Oak Knoll Hospital even though the Reuse Plan calls for
**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

CREATING A MORE EFFECTIVE CITY ROLE IN CLEANUP
Localities are negotiating many aspects of base conversion, including
leases, retrocession, agreements to provide city services, and the terms of
conveyance of base assets. Although these issues may be nominally separate
from cleanup, in practice they are part of a negotiated package, which
explicitly or implicitly includes cleanup decisions.

At Hunters Point, the Cleanup Work Plan does not reference San Francisco's
Reuse Plan. The Navy will incur great expense saving a building when they
remove the soil beneath it, even though the City does not intend to reuse
that building. The Navy plans to replace pavement in an area scheduled for
restoration as a wetland

This will become even more true in the future because DOD's backloading of
cleanup expenditures beyond 2001 will create strong pressure on localities
to accept dirty transfers. The immediate fiscal problems for localities
associated with postponed cleanup will make it harder for cities to pay
attention to the longer term liabilities associated with accepting
conveyance of contaminated real estate.

To cope responsibly with these pressures, city managers need to ensure that
they and the elected officials they serve are fully informed about the full
range of cleanup options. They need to develop their capacity to
---review and propose changes as appropriate on all cleanup documents;
---prevent wasting of remediation funding caused by lack of coordination
with redevelopment plans;
---analyze potential liability of all agreements with the military for city
services and operation and maintenance of utilities;
---research the full range of liability exposures of dirty transfer 
proposals;
---work with their Congressional delegations to augment unofficial city
influence over cleanup decisions (in the absence of cities' formal role),
while trying to create a seat at the table for local government officials;
---strongly advocate full and timely funding requests by DOD, and
responsiveness by Congress, and
---collaborate with localities from the 200 congressional districts affected
by base closures to make the base cleanup process more sensitive to local 
needs.

<<<sidebar begins>>>*********************************
San Francisco's Presidio is the only former military base being turned into
a national park. The park contains a dozen old landfills degrading the water
quality with incinerator waste, lead, asbestos, and other toxic materials.
Hydraulic fluid from an abandoned 1950 Nike missile silo threatens to taint
Lobos Creek --- the City's last free-flowing stream, and lead from the
deserted firing ranges might thwart the National Park Service's plans to
restore natural wetlands and a tidal marsh.

Though the Park Service expects millions of visitors a year, and some of the
contamination lies under baseball fields and beside popular camp sites, the
Army has decided not to remove the toxic waste. The remaining $36 million in
cleanup funds will be used to monitor and restrict polluted areas for the
next three decades. Barbara Griffon, Presidio's new general manager, doubts
the Army will be able to enforce their restriction plans. Critics also
accuse the Army of inflating the cost of cleanup while minimizing the 
dangers.
**************<<<sidebar ends>>>

<<<editor's note begins>>>*******************************
Mr. Bloom is a member of the California Environmental Protection Agency Base
Closures Environmental Advisory Group, the East Bay Conversion and
Reinvestment Commission, the Hunters Point Citizens Advisory Committee, and
the Restoration Advisory Boards for the Presidio and the Oakland Army Bases.
Mr. Bloom is Executive Director of Arc Ecology. Before joining the staff of
Arc Ecology, he was a national campaign coordinator for Greenpeace USA.

As staff economist/planner for Arc Ecology, Eve Bach provides technical
assistance to San Francisco Bay Area communities dealing with military base
closures, and has written about the economic aspects of contamination and
cleanup, community development, and habitat restoration. Before joining the
Arc Ecology staff, she was the Assistant City Manager for Planning and
Community Development for the City of Berkeley, California.
*********<<<editor's note ends>>>