UXO Report Executive Summary

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

(Here follows the complete, official executive summary of the Defense
Science Board Report on unexploded ordnance clearance. My summary last
week, and as far as I can tell, the executive summary, neglect to
mention one controversial issue. In the main body of the report the DSB
task force recommends that funding for addition UXO clearance research
and development come from monies now devoted to actual UXO clearance. -
Lenny)

Report Of The Defense Science Board Task Force
ON UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) CLEARANCE, ACTIVE RANGE UXO CLEARANCE,
AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) PROGRAMS

April 1998

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Contamination of land and sea from unexploded ordnance has grown to a
level where it now presents a serious problem in the United States. The
contamination prevents civilian land use, threatens public safety and
causes environmental concerns. Estimates provided to the Task Force
indicate that over 15 million acres in the United States may contain
some level of UXO contamination, at about 1,500 different sites. This
figure does not include the acreage of UXO contamination undersea.

Virtually all UXO contamination in the United States results from
weapons system testing and/or troop training activities conducted by the
Department of Defense (DoD). Property containing UXO includes active
military sites and land transferring or transferred to private use, such
as Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and Base Realignment And Closure
(BRAC) sites. DoD's responsibilities include providing UXO site clean-up
project management, assuring compliance with federal, state and local
laws and environmental regulations, assumption of liability, and
appropriate interactions with the public.

DoD has no specific UXO remediation policy, goals or program. Current
UXO site remediation efforts are based on decades-old technology and use
several procedures that are inefficient, labor-intensive and costly.
Because the suspect sites have not been surveyed, there is great
uncertainty about the actual size of the UXO problem. However, even if
only 5% of suspect acreage needs cleanup, remediation costs would still
be high (possibly exceeding 15 billion dollars) and times would be long
(possibly exceeding several decades to complete) using current
technologies. UXO site remediation in the United States currently is
being funded at about $125M per year, excluding special clean-up
programs (such as the on-going clean-up at Kaho'olawe, which has funding
projected to total about $400M).

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The key to more efficient UXO remediation lies in the products that can
come from an aggressive development of cost effective remediation
technology to replace currently fielded tools and practices. The Task
Force concludes, however, that DoD is not yet positioned to execute the
required technology program. Except for the recent Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiatives, DoD's RDT&E base lacks a
coherent set of technology requirements specifically designed to support
UXO remediation needs. The Services' RDT&E base reflect the warfighting
needs of the Military Departments, and the UXO support is incidental.
DoD's current UXO related RDT&E effort to develop the needed tools is
estimated to be about $20M per year.

CURRENT APPROACH: "MAG AND FLAG"

The technologies currently used for sub surface UXO remediation requires
walking with metal detection devices, placing a flag at each location of
a detection and manually digging up detected objects - traditional "Mag
and Flag". These techniques are not cost effective for large areas of
land nor feasible for all terrain. Most important, "Mag and Flag"
surveys are plagued by excessive false alarm rates. Some sites will have
more than 100 subsurface non-ordnance items (clutter) flagged and
excavated for each actual ordnance item found and removed. Under normal
circumstances UXO remediation costs could be as high as $20,000 per
acre. However under emergency situations, the cost could be much
higher. (For example, UXO remediation efforts at Spring Valley in
Washington, DC, performed between Jan 1993-Jan 1995 under RCRA emergency
procedures, cost about $45,000 per acre). Highly cluttered sites may
require complete excavation due to the number of false alarms. Of the
approximately $125M per year spent on UXO remediation, about $70-80M per
year is expended by using such labor-intensive practices.

In the near term, the biggest potential improvement in the detection and
discrimination of UXO to depths of three feet or more is expected to
come from a special configuration of magnetometers, electromagnetic
induction (EMI) and data processing. A magnetometer can measure the
change in the earth's magnetic field due to the presence of a nearby
object having magnetic permeability. An EMI detector imposes an
external, time-varying magnetic field on the region and detects the
effect caused by objects which are electrically conducting (magnetic or
nonmagnetic). By using arrays of both instruments, and three axis EMI
drive, in concert with appropriate computer algorithms, and fusion of
that information, the operator will be able not only to detect and
determine the position of an object, but also determine if it is
magnetic, estimate whether it is a single piece or a cluster of pieces,
and estimate its aspect ratio (length to width) and orientation. The
proper development and application of these technologies is expected to
reduce the false alarms by about a factor of 10.

To obtain such a capability, the Task Force recommends a two track
approach.

Track 1. The first track calls for the aggressive development and
demonstration of a baseline system-of-systems approach to reduce the
false alarms by about a factor of 10. In our view, it would be
appropriate to conduct a competitive effort by at least two industrial
systems integration teams. The development and demonstration efforts are
expected to require 3-5 years to achieve the objective and would include
demonstration of integrated, ground and aerial precision navigation,
aerial survey detections of surface and near surface objects, vehicular
and man portable equipment to detect and categorize objects and the
appropriate computer architecture, data base and processing algorithms.
The Task Force emphasizes contractor integrated, to assure common
communications, navigation, data bases, etc. Over the next 3 to 5 years
we would expect these activities to average about $20M per year.

Track 2. The second track would involve an aggressive research and
development effort, running in parallel with the effort described above.
The objectives would be to explore some avenues which have received too
little attention in the past (e.g., seismic/acoustic, neutron
activation, synthetic dog's nose, motion of subsurface objects over
time, etc.) and also to conduct research on those pacing elements used
in the baseline approach which will benefit from continuing and
competitive research, such as the characterization of clutter at
different sites, clutter rejection algorithms, design of sensor arrays,
etc. The Task Force proposes that this second track be performed largely
by universities coupled with industry, and also funded at about $20M per
year.

Since the current UXO-related R&D is funded at about $20M per year, the
proposed program can be judged as about a two-fold increase. The basic
justification for such an increase is that the DoD is spending about
$125M per year on UXO remediation using a very inefficient approach.
Current understanding of the physics and experimental data to date
suggest that by developing the proper tools, DoD will save about $60-70M
per year. As such, it would be a good and urgent investment.

Once the baseline program demonstrates the required reduction in the
false alarm rate, the Task Force recommends that DoD rely on industry to
commercialize the technologies into systems for use in UXO remediation.
It will be important to continue the second track activities because of
its value to DoD range clearing and countermine operations, specifically
the detection of non-metallic landmines and the detection and
characterization of more deeply buried objects (5-20 feet).

If DoD is to be successful in introducing major technological
improvements, it will be necessary not only to verify the improvements
but also to initiate educational and training programs to accomplish two
objectives. First, to convince the operational experts that the new
systems are safe and can be trusted. And second, to train the operators
in the use of the computer and associated software.

EASING FUTURE UXO PROBLEMS

A number of steps should be taken to reduce future deposits of
unexploded ordnance and ease its clean-up. For example, the use of
navigational and positioning systems can help map UXO locations more
precisely, active ranges may employ "fire-finding" instrumentation to
accurately track ordnance to impact points during tests, and the
development of taggants for ordnance and explosive materials to help
identification of specific UXO on-site. Improved data keeping and
archiving as well as periodic sweeping at active ranges will also prove
very helpful in reducing uncertainties about the type and number of
potential UXO on ranges and help prolong the useful life of the range.

The Task Force recommends including "Render Safe Procedures" and
"Disposal Procedures" guidance as part of DoD Directive 5000.2R. This
action would incorporate these important procedures much earlier than
the Milestone III decision point, where they currently begin, and help
reduce the number of future UXO.

ORGANIZATION FOR AND EXECUTION OF DOD-WIDE UXO REMEDIATION PROGRAM

The Task Force recommends the following assignments:

* To address DoD's management responsibilities for UXO, the Task Force
recommends the assignment of a focal point within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) for oversight of UXO remediation activities
in the Department of Defense. This focal point would recommend UXO
remediation objectives and policy to the Secretary of Defense, formulate
an investment strategy for the allocation of resources based upon the
expected performance of advanced technology, promulgate the UXO RDT&E
program's priorities (but not set the RDT&E program and budget level),
establish goals and requirements, and recommend and support investments
in new technology to remedy UXO safety and cost issues. The Task Force
believes the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense/Environmental Security
(DUSD/ES) is the logical focal point, given its existing
responsibilities.

* Current DoD Active Range policy has a number of gaps that need to be
filled. These include the inadequate dissemination of some "Top Secret"
information to the UXO/EOD community and the cessation of practices that
threaten the long term viability of active ranges. The Task Force
recommends formation of a DoD-wide Active Range Policy that addresses
safety issues, advocates range clean-up initiatives to maintain the
long-term viability of the range (e.g. avoids creating areas with
permanent UXO contamination), and that improves information management
concerning the location and clean-up following the testing/training and
emergency drops of "Special Compartmented Ordnance."

* DoD should develop a risk-based priority system, similar to the
Relative Risk Site Evaluation Framework for hazardous waste sites, to
weigh the many competing UXO needs, based upon explosive risks, other
human health risks, ecological concerns, and other pertinent factors,
including current and future property use. Such priority determinations
should be made in consultation with environmental regulatory agencies
and the affected public. The present approach to clean-up varies widely
from site to site and does not have clearly established methods for
assessing priorities and risks. A two-stage risk management process
should be employed, the first stage focusing on immediate responses to
UXO risks, and the second designed to provide subsequent responses to
risks.

* Many Tribal Lands are Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and contain
substantial amounts of UXO. The Task Force notes that these Lands
present an immediate threat to public safety due to insufficient DoD
clean-up and lack of tribal government authority to issue land use
restrictions. To remedy these immediate safety problems, the Task Force
recommends accelerated improvement of UXO remediation efforts on Tribal
lands.

* To address the fragmented technology base, the Task Force recommends
that the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) develop a
DoD-wide RDT&E investment strategy and initiate an aggressive R&D
program along the lines of the two track approach described earlier.

* To address technical challenges and RDT&E funding shortfalls, the Task
Force recommends establishing a specific UXO RDT&E account controlled by
OSD (by Director, Defense Research and Engineering) and coordinated with
other related RDT&E efforts. The Task Force suggests funding the
increase in this account over the next 3-5 years by using offsets from
the total clean-up budget. Execution of the RDT&E program will occur
through the Services and Defense Agencies, in coordination with the
Joint UXO Coordinating Office.

OUTSOURCING OF UXO REMEDIATION WORK

As the proposed Range Rule and the new Munitions Rule are implemented,
we foresee an increase in the demands for near term remediation. The
Task Force is persuaded that UXO remediation is not now and should not
be a core competence of the DoD. As a consequence it is recommended that
incentives be provided to outsource this work to industry. The Task
Force believes that it will be necessary for the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to modify its contracting process for UXO remediation. Current
contracting terms tend to discourage the use of new tools (technologies
that have not been formally certified by DoD as acceptable for use in
the contract). The current use of a time and materials approach does not
provide an incentive for efficiency. Strict liability is frequently
required of the contractor, creating exposure to long term suits often
deemed unacceptable by larger companies. The contracting is generally
for small tasks. As a consequence, most of the remediation is performed
by Small and Small Disadvantaged Business (8a) set-asides who have no
real technology base to offer and very limited technology assets. In
summary, the result is a remediation program that does not build or
expand present industrial capabilities.

The Task Force recommends that UXO site clean up activities be packaged
and outsourced entirely to contractors to achieve more cost effective
solutions. Performance-based contracting procedures should be required
and the Federal Acquisition Regulations used to relieve private
companies of unreasonable third party liability and indemnification
burdens. Further contractual arrangements should provide incentives to
stimulate industry to invest in and use advanced technology. The
objective is to have industry commercialize and apply DoD developed
technologies as well as to develop their own proprietary products.

Equally important is the need for stable funding. Quarterly funding does
not allow the execution of a long-term project, because most work is
under the Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) concept. This
results in needless temporary duty assignments and a significant
unnecessary cost in travel.

Future base closures should have full disclosure of any UXO problems, if
any, early on, so the public, Congress and the Administration will be
aware of any UXO issue and the likely costs for certain land reuse so
that property use and transfer plans can be made accordingly.

The Task Force review of UXO (and EOD) technologies currently used at
active ranges revealed a dependence on outdated techniques and tools.
Improvements are needed in the technology and tools used at these ranges
to help ensure better safety of personnel and to maintain long term
viability of the ranges.

Scrap material sold to wholesalers has also inadvertently contained UXO.
A policy is needed to direct the processing of all scrap material that
is potentially contaminated with UXO. Active ranges should have ready
access to suitable processing equipment, such as flash furnaces, to
process this scrap material.

Lenny Siegel
Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
c/o PSC, 222B View St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/968-1126
lsiegel@cpeo.org