[CPEO-MEF] APGSCC Range Directive Comments

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

From: Cal Baier-Anderson" <cbaie001@umaryland.edu>



January 23, 2001

Dear Col. Selstrom:

The Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition (APGSCC) is a
community organization formed to work closely with the Aberdeen Proving
Ground (APG) in the cleanup of its hazardous waste sites. For more than
a decade, we have monitored the remedial activities and worked closely
with the APG Installation Restoration Program to address contamination
issues. APGSCC is the recipient of EPA Superfund Technical Assistance
Grants, which has provided us with the financial means to obtain
technical assistance to enable the community to participate more
effectively in the remedial process as it progresses at APG. 

UXO/Range issues are a priority concern for the community around APG.
Therefore, we are taking this opportunity to comment on the Outline for
DoD Directive, Subject: Department of Defense (DoD) Policy for Closed,
Transferred and Transferring Ranges Containing Military Munitions, which
is posted on the Denix website. Please accept APGSCC's attached comments
prepared by APGSCC and their technical advisors, Dr. Cal Baier-Anderson
and Dr. Katherine S. Squibb, University of Maryland, Baltimore, Program
in Toxicology.

Sincerely,

Cal Baier-Anderson for APGSCC

***


Outline for DoD Directive
Subject: Department of Defense (DoD) Policy for Closed, Transferred and
Transferring Ranges Containing Military Munitions

Comments Prepared for APGSCC by

Cal Baier-Anderson and Katherine Squibb
University of Maryland, Baltimore
Program in Toxicology
January 23, 2001


COMMENT 1: Section 1
It is extremely important that the major goals (including, but not
limited to, regulatory drivers) of this DoD Directive be clearly and
unambiguously articulated in this section, as this will set the
framework for the development of a comprehensive policy that addresses
the multitude of concerns regarding range closure.  The outline includes
two basic response goals: protection from explosive hazards, and
reduction of risk to human health and the environment from military
munitions and "other constituents".  The second goal is extremely
ambiguous in that it does not define "other constituents".  We recommend
that the following two goals be added: 1) stakeholder approval through
meaningful stakeholder involvement and 2) mitigation of the potential
human and ecological health effects of chemical contamination caused by
range activities.

Stakeholder Involvement. We believe that the involvement of stakeholders
in the site evaluation and risk assessment process will ultimately
result in the selection of remediation decisions that are technically
successful and have broad approval, thus saving the DoD time and money.
The inclusion of stakeholders is noted in Section 4.3, however, we
recommend that this be articulated in Section 1, with a general outline
as to how the stakeholders will be included in the process to follow in
Section 4.  Specifically, we recommend that stakeholder involvement be
modeled on the CERCLA process, as this process has demonstrated success.

Chemical Contamination. It appears that the military is not making the
actual cleanup of the CTT ranges a priority, since they do not include a
clearly articulated statement to this effect. Instead, the Directive
refers to risk reduction, from munitions and "other constituents", which
presumably includes the massive chemical contamination found on many of
these CTT ranges. 

While we agree that humans must be protected from explosive hazards due
to the presence of UXO, the chemical contaminants that have accumulated
from years of unrestricted testing, such as explosives, metals, chemical
agents and solvents, also pose a significant risk to human health and
the environment.  A commitment to the remediation of chemical
contamination must be stated up front, in Section 1. The statement must
specifically reference chemical contamination that resulted from testing
activities on the ranges. It should also mandate that potential risks be
evaluated, so that all stakeholders will be able to review the analysis
and provide input. An example of such a statement might be: 

1.1	Development and implementation of a response program that strives to
evaluate and remediate risk to human health and the environment from
both the presence of military munitions (including UXO) and the chemical
constituents that result from range testing activities.

1.1.1	Provides protection from explosive hazards
1.1.2	Evaluates and reduces risk to human health and the environment
from residual chemical constituents that contaminate CTT ranges
1.1.3	Includes stakeholders in the evaluation and mitigation of risks
due to munitions and chemical contaminants.


COMMENT 2: Section 1, Appropriate Regulatory Drivers
We believe that the following constitute appropriate regulatory drivers
for this DoD Directive:
*	Presence of military munitions and UXO.
*	Presence of chemical contaminants in various media from range
activities.
*	The presence of UXO must not be used to discourage clean up of
chemical contamination.
Cleanup must be directed towards unrestricted land use, whenever
technically and economically feasible.


COMMENT 3: Section 2, Stakeholder Involvement in CTT Range Delineation
Because the delineation of the CTT range, and the inclusion or exclusion
of specific sites on that range will determine the success of any
remedial action, it is critical that stakeholders be involved in the
selection of the types of sites that are included in the delineation of
the CTT range.  


COMMENT 4: Section 2, Scope of Program
We recommend that this program be an integrated Range Response Program,
which includes both UXO and chemical contaminant cleanup.


COMMENT 5: Section 2, Eroding Shorelines as "Transferred Ranges"
Aberdeen Proving Ground is located along the western shore of the
Chesapeake Bay.  Impact areas are eroding at an alarming rate such that
munitions (including unexploded ordnance and chemical agent-filled
munitions) are tumbling into the bay and its tributaries, posing a
significant risk to the boating public.  We propose that these
near-shore areas that were once actually part of active ranges but have
subsequently eroded away, be defined as "transferred ranges".  This
proposal is based on the fact that the underwater land occupied by these
munitions was once Army property; the erosion that has taken place has
in effect "transferred" the property beyond the limits of effective Army
control. Thus the eroded land is shared by the general public.  In fact,
it is extremely difficult to patrol and police this eroded shore area.
We believe that the classification of the area adjacent to the erosional
coastline of ranges merits serious consideration, so that this serious
problem might obtain the attention it merits.


COMMENT 6: Section 4.1.2 Data Gaps
In order to guarantee the protection of human health and the
environment, we must first have adequate information regarding the
toxicity of the contaminants present on military ranges. We must
acknowledge that there have been very few studies examining the
potential risks that common range contaminants, including chemical
explosive compounds, pose to human and ecological receptors.  Of
particular concern is the limited information regarding the effects of
complex mixtures (e.g., explosive compounds, metals, chemical agents and
solvents) on human and ecological receptors. These data gaps must be
addressed if the DoD intends to honor this policy directive. We cannot
afford to wait 10 years or more to determine that a serious contaminant
problem is present, which was not predicted due to these data gaps.

In fact, the closing of military ranges presents an opportunity for
research that would begin to address these data gaps. We urge the DoD to
demonstrate their commitment to the protection of human health and the
environment by providing funds to address these serious data gaps.  The
funds can be used to hire scientists to investigate very specific
research questions. Examples of the types of questions that require
study include: 
*	What are the potential effects of common range contaminants on the
survival, growth and reproduction of range land inhabitants? 
*	Is plant uptake of contaminants significant?
*	Are the contaminants that accumulate in plants (such as RDX)
bioavailable to herbivores? 
*	What is the uptake of common range contaminants by game animals? 
*	What is the potential risk posed to humans by the consumption of
contaminated game animals? 
*	Are range contaminants impacting stream ecosystems?
*	Can common range contaminants move off of the ranges to adjacent areas
and to groundwater?
The identification of appropriate protective actions can not be made
until we have a better understanding of the environmental effects of
common range contaminants.


COMMENT 7: Section 4.1.3 Future Use
This section calls for the designation of "reasonably anticipated future
land use" which, in turn, drives cleanup.  We reject this policy.  The
determination of potential future use is political in nature, and
subject to numerous pressures, outside of the technical and
environmental merits of the designation. 

The most straightforward, objective approach to this question is to
state that the goal of range cleanup must be to permit unlimited,
unrestricted future use of the land. We acknowledge that this may not
always be possible, due to either excessive levels of contamination,
technical limitations, or budget constraints.  In this case, the
arguments for more limited cleanup must be presented and agreed upon by
all stakeholders. A reasonable, attainable cleanup goal can then be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  But the process must begin with an
assumption that excellence is attainable and that we will aim for the
best possible cleanup level.


COMMENT 8: Section 4.1.4.1 UXO and Risk
This section states that risk reduction will be attained by reducing the
potential for contact with military munitions, to include UXO, and
eliminating, reducing, or controlling the potential exposure to other
constituents.  We would like to emphasize that the presence of UXO
should not, in and of itself, be used as an excuse to rule out the
cleanup of other range contaminants. Explosives safety can still be made
a priority; the technical achievements in the field of UXO excavation
and destruction are impressive, and we expect that this field will
continue to advance.  We believe that these skills and technologies can
be safely employed to find, remove and destroy UXO, which will allow for
the safe cleanup of contaminated ranges.  

Moreover, the best way to reduce risks associated with UXO is to remove
and destroy the UXO. All other alternatives are temporary measures that
place these risks on the next generation.  This is unacceptable.  The
best time to deal with UXO hazards (and chemical contaminants) is
periodically during the life of the range.


COMMENT 9: Section 4.3, Process for Stakeholder Involvement
The process by which stakeholder involvement will take place must be
stated here.  We recommend that this process be modeled on CERCLA, as
the provisions in CERCLA for public participation have proven to be
effective. Involvement of all interested parties in clean-up decisions
from the initial stages to the end is the only way to assure that the
final  plan will be equitable and therefore accepted by all
participants.


COMMENT 10: Section 4, Need for Additional Expertise
We recommend the addition of a section within 4.6 indicating that while
DoD does not have expertise in the evaluation and remediation of
chemical contamination, it will form partnerships with other federal and
state agencies that do have this expertise, or contract with appropriate
entities to insure that necessary remedial actions will be taken.


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