This is an interesting -
and, from I have been able to discern as an observer of
Brownfields related trends in this country, quite timely and relevant
- discussion currently taking place in many American states and
communities. My friend and colleague Larry Schnapf rightly points to what
is likely to be a roiling debate in NY (and elsewhere) about the proper
scope and use of financial incentives in incentivizing cleanup, redevelopment,
and reuse of contaminated sites. Recommended reading in this regard is
Destiny USA Development, LLC v. New York State Department of
Conservation, Index No. 08-1015 (May 7, 2008), where the court wrote in
highly unflattering terms about the state regulatory agency's decision to
substitute its own judgment for Brownfields related economic policy created by
the legislature and deny a developer's access to critical and critically needed
tax incentives. I've attached a copy of that decision to this email
(although I'm not sure that it will be transmitted successfully to the
distribution list; if it doesn't come through, email me and I'll forward it to
you). Here in Florida, where an anemic array of financial incentives is
about to come into sharp focus due, in large part, to an avoidable exhaustion of
an annual tax credit allocation for voluntary cleanups, several local
governments are looking to, in the view of some critics, "game the
system" by designating hundreds if not thousands of acres of land "Brownfield
Areas" in order to tap into a state based tax refund (as opposed to tax credit)
program tied to the creation of new jobs on impaired sites. Due to
the very loose language in the underlying statute that authorizes such
designations, Brownfield Areas in Florida can - and often do - incorporate
multiple parcels with absolutely no actual or perceived impairment from
historical or current incidents of contamination. For more on this, see http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2008/jun/29/brownfield-overly-large/.
All that being said, and,
again, I'm speaking from a perspective that was formed in the crucible of the
American Brownfields movement (and freely concede that the European model
may be quite different), here - and Florida in particular - contamination is far
from a "minor irritant" and CERCLA (and its state and local counterparts)
is, at best, unwieldy to fully "deal with large, unacceptable, risks to human
health and the environment." With respect to the former (contamination
being a "minor irritant"), contamination is, firstly, a hugely upsetting dynamic
in real estate transactions and development activities. Where to
start? It ferociously disrupts - and makes grossly more time consuming and
expensive - financing, even with the secured creditor protections that are now
available (sort of) at the federal level but which likely have no applicability
at the state or local level. And, in today's financial environment, where
the credit markets are locking up tighter than the proverbial drum, the specter
of contamination (actual or potential) looms larger than ever before.
Secondly, as regulators become more involved in and sophisticated about the nuts
and bolts of development and construction and achieve a much deeper
understanding of the implications of construction activities and the way in
which contaminated media may be displaced, disturbed, exacerbated, and
transported (and all of the various exposure scenarios that result from same),
new rules and requirements and mandates are imposed that create additional costs
for, and schedule and design burdens on, development projects. (As
just one example of how long-accepted norms of development and construction
become newly and acutely burdened by evolving understandings of the behavior of
contaminated media in the environment, see EPA's excellent, recently
published guidance document:Vapor Intrusion Considerations for
Redevelopment Primer, which can be accessed at http://www.brownfieldstsc.org/pdfs/BTSC%20Vapor%20Intrusion%20Considerations%20for%20Redevelopment%20EPA%20542-R-08-001.pdf) Thirdly
- and not to be downplayed or de-emphasized in any way by its placement in this
litany - is the public health imperative posed by and created by
contamination. And there is much to say about this too.
Whether the location is a city, town, or village in America, Europe, South
America, the Caribbean, Africa, the former Soviet Union, or elsewhere (spin
the globe and place your finger anywhere; all Brownfields are local),
contamination is not a minor irritant to those who have been continuously
exposed to it in their air, in their water, in their soil - we could go
on. The public health threat dynamic creates special concerns and
obligations for Brownfield developers. Special concerns and obligations in
terms of how to quickly extinguish - and then treat - the exposure.
Special concerns and obligations in how to evaluate - and then manage - the cost
risk and legal liability risk associated with the exposure. Special
concerns and obligations in how to reach out to - and then embrace - those
impacted by public health and public health injury issues (not only those
directly impacted but their families and their friends too). For an
excellent meditation on these public health issues, see "Poor, Black, and Dumped
On," by the brilliant essayist Bob Herbert in the New York Times ("The evidence
has been before us for decades that black people, other ethnic minorities and
some poor whites have been getting sick and enduring horrible deaths from the
filth that they breathe, eat, drink, and otherwise ingest from the garbage
dumps, landfills, incinerators, toxic waste sties, oil refineries, petrochemical
plants and other world-class generators of pollution that have been deliberately
and relentlessly installed in the neighborhoods where they live, work, worship,
and go to school."): http://select.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/opinion/05herbert.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
I'm going to come back to
the Bob Herbert essay in a couple of paragraphs because it really underscores
the point that Larry was making and that I feel many in the Brownfields
community also embrace in terms of championing special economic incentives for
Brownfield projects that shouldn't be drawn down on for other revitalization
projects that lack a contamination component (and contamination imperative). But
first, there is one other point - and it's a fair point - that Paul raised that
I feel needs to be addressed: that CERCLA is "designed" and therefore, perhaps,
equipped, to "identify and deal with large, unacceptable, risks to human
health and the environment." Twenty five years worth of experience in this
country with CERCLA - and all of the litigation, process, waste, posturing,
drama, and heat associated with its implementation and enforcement - have taught
us that CERCLA alone is an imperfect vehicle as a catalyst for cleanup,
redevelopment, and reuse. Certainly in terms of launching a
cleanup-to-redevelopment-to-reuse continuum that works as a linear narrative,
CERCLA is, much more often than not, the anti-catalyst and,
instead, operates to ensure that the continuum stays mired in first gear
while the regulators and lawyers have at one another.
What CERCLA - in my
experience - brings into stark relief is this: that the power of the private
sector in partnership with public sector based incentives is a truly awesome and
truly catalyzing force for cleanup and redevelopment. As ineffective and
outmoded as CERCLA has proven itself to be to move businesses, communities,
lenders, investors, individuals and other stakeholders to take up the brutal,
laboring oar of cleanup, the Brownfields paradigm has proven sublime. Many
billions of dollars in capital all over the world have been lured into the
impaired property marketplace to remediate contamination, to recycle land, to
enhance and sustain communities, and to protect and repair public health.
And this vast movement of capital has occurred on its volition - without any
legal obligation and without the threat of enforcement - simply because market
conditions were rightly set by policy makers and law makers who primed the pump
with an impressive and diverse portfolio of financial and (not to be overlooked)
regulatory incentives.
So, getting back to
Larry's point, whether the incentive is state based, federal based, or local in
nature, if it has been created to promote the cleanup, redevelopment, and reuse
of contaminated sites - in all of their glory and gory - there is an economic
and public health imperative that those (very limited) dollars remain targeted
for Brownfield sites. The "generators of pollution," about whom Bob
Herbert writes and whose legacies of filth exist in neighborhoods all over
the world (although most insidiously in communities where ethnic minorities and
the poor live, work, worship and go to school), have succeed in creating
revitalization challenges of epic and truly demoralizing proportions. These
challenges, in turn, require financial tools that are meaningful, overwhelming,
inviolate, and not susceptible to being diverted or diminished.
Larry's bottom line from
his initial post is the central theme here: "[I]n states with limited funds,
brownfield programs should not be used to fix what is often times an
underlying economic problem." I'll add to that this implied corollary:
Where Brownfield programs exist, they should remain squarely focused on
exclusively allocating much needed dollars to sites where market
impairment, economic dysfunction, and public health insult all stem from
environmental contamination. The
contamination imperative (anything but a minor irritant) and the operative
shortcomings of CERCLA and its state and local counterparts (a structure
predisposed to litigation not recycling) underscore the place and critical need
for targeted, precise financial incentives as a mechanism to move private
capital into environmental cleanup and environmental redevelopment and the reuse
that results from both. This critical need is now being played out in
Michigan (where we started with this post on Wednesday), in New York, soon in
Florida, and I suspect, simultaneously, in many other places across our
spinning Brownfields planet.
Respectfully
submitted,
Michael
Michael R. Goldstein, Esq.
Akerman Senterfitt
One Southeast Third Avenue, 28th
Floor
Miami, FL 33131
Direct Line: 305.982.5570
Direct Facsimile: 305.349.4787
Mobile Phone: 305.962.7669
"Recycle, Reuse, and Restore
Environmentally Impacted Properties: Rebuild Your Community One Brownfield at a
Time"
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From:
brownfields-bounces@lists.cpeo.org [mailto:brownfields-bounces@lists.cpeo.org]
On Behalf Of Paul Nathanail Sent: Friday, July 04, 2008 3:09
AM To: LSchnapf@aol.com; brownfields@lists.cpeo.org Subject:
Re: [CPEO-BIF] Scope of Brownfield Program-continued
Larry asked "If a
state brownfield program has limited funds, why should it be used to renovate an
obsolete building when there is another redevelopment tool available. The
limited state brownfield funding should be reserved for those sites where the
contamination is the reason the site is not being redeveloped. " Without
caveating my answer to death, a renovated building is then available for
reoccupation and can then be a part of the revitalisation of a neighbourhood. A
remediated site still needs redevelopment before regeneration can take place. In
the case of economically marginal sites UK public funds are invested in
infrastructure and reclamation in order to create a platform on which the
private sector can build.
It is very difficult - virtually impossible - to buck
the regional or dare one suggest the global economy. However certainly in the UK
our experience has been that dealing with the contamination does not help a site
return to beneficial use. CERCLA - and our own Part 2A of the Environmental
Protection Act 1990 - are designed to identify and deal with large,
unnacceptable, risks to human health and the environment.
The problems of
'structural change' - are large scale unemployment - of both people and land.
The solution to the derelict sites Larry refers to and which are very similar to
those here in the UK and across other parts of Europe has to be to create
conditions where people are needed, biodiversity protected and business wants to
take advantage of. The presence of contamination is only a minor irritant to
investors, it is other larger issues that dictate investment
decisions.
Intervention has to be broader than just remediaiton and
because of the changes to our economy since the late 1970s we have had to find
strategies to protect biodiversity and create employment opportunities in order
to maintain the conditions for sustainable communities, Specific examples you
may want to google are Derby's Pride Park, Manchester's Trafford Centre,
Uxbridge's Stockley Park - there are others across Europe too. My own University
is slowly taking over tracts of derelict former industrial land in west
Nottingham (Jubillee Campus) and the vacant and underused former Carlton TV
studios (Kings Meadows campus).
best regards and I hope you all have a
fantastic 4 July holiday!
Paul Nathanail
I have to respectfully disagree with my friend from the other side of the
pond.
If the problem with a site is the underlying social-economic conditions,
shouldn't the problem be the focus of the public tools specially designed for
economic development. Brownfield programs are intended to address the sites
where the environmental issues are contributing to the under-utilization or
development.
We have been having quite a debate in NY on the proper scope of the
brownfield program. Upstate NY has lots of under-utilized sites that no amount
of brownfield incentives could fix because it is the regional economy and not
the contamination that is the obstacle for redevelopment. we have the most
generous brownfield program in the country and it has not been enough of an
incentive upstate because it does not change the underlying economic
conditions.
CERCLA type legislation is not the answer either since we have had lots of
sites cleaned up in NY but the sites remain un-used because the regional economy
does not support an economically-viable reuse.
If a state brownfield program has limited funds, why should it be used to
renovate an obsolete building when there is another redevelopment tool
available. The limited state brownfield funding should be reserved for those
sites where the contamination is the reason the site is not being redeveloped.
Larry
Lawrence
Schnapf Adjunct Professor-New York Law School 55 E.87th Street
#8B/8C New York, NY 10128 212-876-3189 (h) 212-756-2205
(w) 212-593-5955 (f) 203-263-5212
(weekend) www.environmental-law.net
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